Journal of Social and Political Psychology
https://jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp
<h1>Journal of Social and Political Psychology</h1> <h2 class="mt-0" style="color: #646464;">Publishing research from multiple theoretical and methodological perspectives — <em>Free of charge for authors and readers</em></h2> <hr> <p>The <em>Journal of Social and Political Psychology</em> (JSPP) is a peer-reviewed open-access journal (without author fees). It publishes articles at the intersection of social and political psychology from different epistemological, methodological, theoretical, and cultural perspectives and from different regions across the globe that substantially advance the understanding of social problems, their reduction, and the promotion of social justice.</p> <p><strong>Before submitting, please <a href="/index.php/jspp/peer-review">check our review criteria</a> for the kind of work we publish in the journal. Only manuscripts that meet these criteria will be sent out for review.</strong></p>PsychOpen GOLD / Leibniz Institut for Psychology (ZPID)en-USJournal of Social and Political Psychology2195-3325<p>Authors who publish with Journal of Social and Political Psychology (JSPP) agree to the following terms:</p> <ul> <li>Articles are published under the <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License</a> (CC BY 4.0).<br>Under the CC BY license, authors retain ownership of the copyright for their article, but authors grant others permission to use the content of publications in JSPP in whole or in part provided that the original work is properly cited. Users (redistributors) of JSPP are required to cite the original source, including the author's names, JSPP as the initial source of publication, year of publication, volume number and DOI (if available).</li> <li>Authors may publish the manuscript in any other journal or medium but any such subsequent publication must include a notice that the manuscript was initially published by JSPP.</li> <li>Authors grant JSPP the right of first publication. Although authors remain the copyright owner, they grant the journal the irrevocable, nonexclusive rights to publish, reproduce, publicly distribute and display, and transmit their article or portions thereof in any manner.</li> </ul>From Self-Interest to Collective Good: How Moral Framing Affects the Justification of Free-Riding Behavior
https://jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp/article/view/17651
<p>Free riding behaviors, such as tax evasion and exploiting public resources, erode societal trust and cooperation. Using a representative survey conducted in Spain (N = 2,000, Catalonia) with an embedded experiment that randomly exposed participants to different moral framings, this study examines how such framings shape attitudes towards free riding, including tax evasion, claiming undeserved benefits or stealing a ride. Drawing on Moral Foundations Theory, we test three framings – social order, pro-community altruism and personal autonomy – based on alignment with Authority, Loyalty, and Liberty moral intuitions, respectively. Results indicate that framing cooperation as a matter of social order significantly reduces justification of free riding, while appeals to pro-community altruism have a weaker but still negative effect. Contrary to expectations, the personal autonomy framing does not increase tolerance for free riding, suggesting limited persuasive power in this context. Mediation analysis indicates that collective orientation functions as a central pathway linking moral framing and attitudes toward free riding. Moderation analysis reveals that political ideology and, to a lesser extent, institutional trust, condition the effects on collective orientation, with right-leaning and low-trust individuals demonstrating greater differences under social order framing as compared to control condition. These findings underscore the role of moral narratives in shaping attitudes toward free riding, with implications for public messaging and policy interventions.</p>Raül TormosEkaterina Nastina
Copyright (c) 2026 Raül Tormos, Ekaterina Nastina
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2026-07-232026-07-2314130332910.5964/jspp.17651Discrete Emotions Towards Leaders and Partisan Affect: Evidence From Five Multiparty Democracies
https://jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp/article/view/15707
<p>This study explores the role of five discrete emotions (hope, pride, anger, fear and disgust) towards political leaders in connection with partisan affinities and animosities. Focusing on the under-represented regions of Latin America and Southern Europe, this research examines emotional patterns across five diverse multiparty systems. Findings show that discrete emotions attributed to leaders behave similarly to valence-based measures, but can help nuance interpretation of affective polarisation dynamics. Deeper understanding of the nature of emotional responses may be warranted in order to determine the extent to which affective polarisation constitutes a threat or an asset to democracies.</p>Zoe A. Thomson
Copyright (c) 2026 Zoe A. Thomson
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2026-07-092026-07-0914127630210.5964/jspp.15707From Internalized Equality to Tolerance Towards Others: Self-Respect Predicts Tolerance for Minority Groups in Serbia and Syria
https://jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp/article/view/17605
<p>Prior research has shown that self-respect (i.e., a person’s belief of possessing the same rights as others) predicted concern for others’ rights (in terms of positive attitudes towards human rights) and a generally tolerant attitude towards dissenting others. In this research, we go beyond prior research and investigate whether self-respect is associated with tolerance towards minority groups in countries where socio-political (and religious) tensions existing between majority and minority groups are relatively high. For this purpose, we asked Serbians (N = 194) and Syrians (N = 313) to fill out questionnaires including measures of self-respect, tolerance towards three different minority groups (an ethnic, a religious, and a sexual minority) and respective disapproval measures, and tested a hypothesized structural equation model. We found that self-respect predicted tolerance towards Roma, Muslims, and homosexuals in Serbia and towards Palestinian refugees and Christians in Syria. In Syria, no relation was found with tolerance for homosexuals, but statistical variance was limited. We discuss our findings and the limits of self-respect as a predictor of tolerance in the context of highly disapproved outgroups and highlight the overall potential of self-respect for fostering a concern for own and others’ rights and duties.</p>Daniela RengerAli MosaStefano Passini
Copyright (c) 2026 Daniela Renger, Ali Mosa, Stefano Passini
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2026-07-092026-07-0914124827510.5964/jspp.17605‘Left-Wing Authoritarianism’ as Situated Rhetoric: Delegitimizing the Political Left in Statements of Greek Right-Wing Politicians on ‘X’
https://jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp/article/view/20061
<p>Soon after the publication of The Authoritarian Personality, scholars advanced the argument that authoritarianism may also be encountered in the political left, fueling a scientific debate that is far from resolved. Adopting a critical discursive social psychology perspective, we analyzed 3,500 X posts shared by Nea Dimokratia (ND) MPs (Greek political right) between 2018-2024, documenting how conservative politicians mobilize a Left-Wing Authoritarianism (LWA) interpretative repertoire. This repertoire is built around the representational modalities of ‘localized political exceptionalism’, ‘extended ideological contamination’, and ‘state authoritarianism in practice’ and informs three argumentative lines. In the first, the Greek political left is constructed as a local exception to the universal left-wing ideology by, allegedly, adopting practices that deviate from democratic values. The second draws upon a broader representation of LWA, associating the Greek political left with international political figures and practices constructed as prototypical left-wing authoritarian examples. The third equates the 2015-2019 left-wing-led SYRIZA-ANEL coalition government with authoritarian deep-state practices, constructing SYRIZA as a persistent threat to democratic norms, while positioning ND as the defender of institutional integrity. The flexible construction of the Greek political left as both aligning with and deviating from generic left-wing ideology works in the direction of delegitimating the political left locally and globally. Through such constructions, the SYRIZA-ANEL government is portrayed as emblematic of authoritarianism, while ND is positioned as a sound anti-extremist democratic force. The paper discusses how LWA repertoire functions rhetorically and ideologically to police democratic boundaries, delegitimize political adversaries, and justify socio-exclusionary politics as depoliticized.</p>Ioannis MichosAntonis SapountzisKyriaki KaragianniNikos BozatzisLia FiggouEvangelos Ntontis
Copyright (c) 2026 Ioannis Michos, Antonis Sapountzis, Kyriaki Karagianni, Nikos Bozatzis, Lia Figgou, Evangelos Ntontis
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2026-07-092026-07-0914122124710.5964/jspp.20061Misperceptions in Protest Affect and Action Among Resident and Diaspora Activists: Online Versus On-the-Ground in the 2009–2012 Iranian Post-Election Protests
https://jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp/article/view/16905
<p>Although collective action is typically led by local actors, remote participation by diaspora members has become common with the rise of social media and digital connectivity. However, differences in modes of participation may lead residents and diaspora activists to represent protests differently or to misperceive each other’s experiences. Such gaps may be reflected in how protests feel and how protest actions are interpreted. This study examined these dynamics in the context of Iran’s 2009–2012 post-election protests. A sample of <em>N</em> = 1,254 respondents residing inside or outside Iran completed tasks assessing their own protest representations or predicting the other group’s experiences. Although the two groups responded similarly from their own perspectives, diaspora members predicted residents’ experiences as significantly less positive, while residents underestimated diaspora members’ action identification, perceiving them as lower-level actors focused more on the mechanics of protest (“how”) than on overarching purposes (“why”). Greater activism was associated with more positive and less negative affect in protest representations. Protest attendance and online information sharing were associated with less biased predictions of affective experiences and action construals. The findings highlight the mutual misperceptions between local and remote participants that can hinder transnational collective action even in the absence of actual differences in protest representations.</p>Mostafa Salari Rad
Copyright (c) 2026 Mostafa Salari Rad
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2026-06-102026-06-1014119322010.5964/jspp.16905Perceptions and Acceptability of Environmental Public Policies in Paris: A Social Justice Lens
https://jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp/article/view/15807
<p>To effectively address current environmental challenges, public policies must provide solutions that are both adapted to and acceptable to the population. It is therefore essential to study the conditions that determine their acceptability. We conducted a quantitative study among Paris residents to explore their perceptions of local and concrete environmental public policies. The aim was to investigate the perceptions of Parisians (<em>N</em> = 699) regarding four environmental public policies implemented in the city of Paris. Specifically, the study examined the elements that most influence perceptions of fairness and the acceptability of these policies, in relation to their degree of coerciveness. Consistent with our hypotheses, the results show a significant relationship between perceived fairness and the acceptability of the policies. Moreover, participants seemed to place great importance on aspects of procedural justice and distributive justice, as well as the opportunity to improve the current socioeconomic system. This tendency was present regardless of whether the policy was coercive or voluntary. Contrary to our expectations, in our study, perceived limitations on residents' freedoms were not directly linked to the perception of fairness and acceptability for coercive policies. Similarly, perceived effectiveness was not particularly linked to perceptions of fairness and acceptability for less coercive policies. These findings have important implications for the design of local public policies.</p>Ellora Frémaux MiguelVirginie Bonnot
Copyright (c) 2026 Ellora Frémaux Miguel, Virginie Bonnot
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2026-05-292026-05-2914110913510.5964/jspp.15807Collective Victimhood and Responsibility Attributions: The Lebanese Civil War Through the Lens of Social Identity
https://jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp/article/view/17805
<p>Two studies examined how victimhood beliefs and responsibility attributions regarding the Lebanese Civil War vary by group membership (Lebanese Christians vs. Muslims) and by religious and national identification. We predicted ingroup-favoring patterns in victimhood beliefs and responsibility attributions, particularly among individuals high in religious identification and low in national identification. Study 1 (<em>N</em> = 405) assessed beliefs following exposure to a chronological war narrative, and Study 2 (<em>N</em> = 338) introduced event type (ingroup harm-doing vs. ingroup victimization). Across studies, religious identification amplified defensive patterns, especially in responsibility attributions, whereas national identification showed limited buffering effects. In Study 2, event type qualified both victimhood beliefs and responsibility attributions: highly religious participants showed ingroup-favoring responses following reminders of ingroup victimization and more symmetrical attributions following harm-doing. National identification played a limited role, mainly among low religious identifiers, and group membership did not significantly moderate outcomes. Despite persistent defensiveness, participants also acknowledged outgroup suffering, suggesting potential for inclusive victimhood in post-conflict Lebanon.</p>Sarah ZahreddineLaurent LicataOlivier KleinAssaad Elia Azzi
Copyright (c) 2026 Sarah Zahreddine, Laurent Licata, Olivier Klein, Assaad Elia Azzi
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2026-05-292026-05-2914113616710.5964/jspp.17805Toward a Kashmiri Cultural Psychology: Integrating Indigenous Knowledge and Mental Health
https://jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp/article/view/19475
<p>This paper presents a critical theoretical intervention addressing epistemic imbalance in mental health research and practice related to Kashmir. It (a) develops conceptual frameworks elucidating indigenous healing rooted in Sufi mysticism, communal networks, and culturally specific coping strategies; (b) identifies and theorizes culturally derived constructs essential for contextually appropriate mental health infrastructures and interventions, emphasizing epistemic justice and locally situated knowledge; and (c) demonstrates culturally grounded interventions that foreground indigenous epistemologies on their own terms, addressing the limitations and potential dominance of Western clinical models. By centering Kashmiriyat, the Valley’s indigenous cultural ethos that encompasses communal solidarity, shrine-centered spiritual practices, and historically rooted coping strategies guiding everyday communal and spiritual life, this work reconceptualizes resilience as collective and historically situated. The proposed framework enriches global psychological theory and offers innovative models of culturally congruent and socially transformative interventions for conflict-affected societies.</p>Mohammad Asif Sheikh
Copyright (c) 2026 Mohammad Asif Sheikh
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2026-05-292026-05-2914116819210.5964/jspp.19475On “Everyday Conspiracist Reasoning” and Its Radicalization: Putting the Psychology of Conspiracy Beliefs in Its Context
https://jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp/article/view/18139
<p>Social psychology explains the endorsement of conspiracy theories by drawing both on trait-like concepts such as conspiracy mentality and on structural factors. While each perspective is indispensable, an integrative framework that synthesises psychological dynamics and structural predictors and embeds them in the social and political contexts in which such beliefs arise remains underdeveloped. In this paper, we propose an approach that conceptualizes conspiracy beliefs through its tension between what we coined “everyday conspiracist reasoning” and “vocal conspiracism.” Everyday conspiracist reasoning describes interpretive frameworks embedded in everyday experiences within society, marked by deep mistrust and suspicion of hidden agendas. These frameworks offer a sense of psychological security in an increasingly unstable environment. However, when individuals face acute personal or societal crises, these everyday orientations may radicalize into vocal conspiracism, which is a more assertive, public, and all-encompassing belief in conspiracies. In these cases, conspiracy thinking can expand to shape an individual’s entire worldview. Political responses to crises and regressive group dynamics partly determine whether this progression intensifies or recedes, with the latter potentially reinforcing conspiracist interpretations.</p>Florian KnasmüllerMarkus Brunner
Copyright (c) 2026 Florian Knasmüller, Markus Brunner
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2026-05-132026-05-131418210810.5964/jspp.18139Responses to Belief-Conflicting Information: Justification of Support for Donald Trump
https://jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp/article/view/16085
<p>These studies take a dissonance theory perspective to understanding why individuals support Donald Trump as president of the United States despite accusations that he has engaged in sexual misconduct and illegal activity. Participants from the US provided open-ended responses to questions that asked why they support Trump and how they justify their support given the allegations against him. Study 1 was conducted in 2019 two months before Trump was impeached for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress. In this study, 7 categories of reasons for supporting Trump, and 3 categories of justification despite allegations, were identified. Study 2 was conducted in 2019 two days after a vote to impeach Trump. Study 3 was conducted in 2022 two days after Trump was arraigned for his involvement in the January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol Building. Results from Studies 2 and 3 replicated the categories of support and justification. Across studies, the reasons given to justify support of Trump despite allegations of wrongdoing were stating that they disbelieved the allegation, claiming that others do similar misdeeds, and stating that they care about his policies, not his personal life. The current results suggest that individuals in a naturalistic context may choose a number of different strategies in response to information that conflicts with their important beliefs, including denying the veracity of information, increasing the importance of consonant information, directing attention to the immoral acts of others, and making cognitions irrelevant to the dissonant relationship. Study 3 provided evidence that some of these processes may be influenced by dissonance discomfort. These results are unlike those of most laboratory research on dissonance theory, in which participants are given only one dissonance reduction opportunity.</p>Cindy Harmon-JonesRobin R. WillardtThomas F. DensonEddie Harmon-Jones
Copyright (c) 2026 Cindy Harmon-Jones, Robin R. Willardt, Thomas F. Denson, Eddie Harmon-Jones
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2026-03-262026-03-26141335610.5964/jspp.16085