The present research examined the interplay of social threat and political mistrust on collective action intentions in the context of Hong Kong social unrest. We investigated perceived social threat from a dominant outgroup and mistrust in the political system as two antecedents of politicized identity, and as indirect predictors of intentions to participate in normative and violent nonnormative collective action. Across two studies (Study 1: N = 398; Study 2: N = 200), we found that perceived social threat, political mistrust, and their interaction had positive significant associations with action intentions (Study 1) and an interactive association (Study 2) with politicized identity. Both studies indicated indirect effects of social threat and political mistrust on both normative and violent collective action intentions through politicized identity. Politicized identity and a broader Hong Kong identity were both directly associated with normative collective action intentions. However, only politicized identity was associated with violent collective action intentions.
Social unrest in Hong Kong escalated between 2014, when the Umbrella Movement demanded universal suffrage, to the 2016 ‘Fishball Revolution,’ and the violent 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement. With widespread support for Hong Kong’s autonomy, the protests drew international media attention and participation in rallies by millions of Hong Kong residents.
Our goal was to understand what factors may have influenced Hong Kongers’ intentions to participate in the social unrest and, more specifically, what factors may have influenced whether protests became more violent. We focused on the role of politicized identity – in this case, whether a person identified as being part of the Hong Kong independence movement - in influencing this choice. We examined whether people who felt a stronger sense of threat from mainland Chinese influences and felt stronger mistrust of Hong Kong political institutions might have had a stronger identification with the political movement. We then examined whether people with this stronger feeling of politicized identity might be more willing to participate in the social unrest and even take violent action.
We analysed data collected from Hong Kong residents in two surveys. The first survey had 398 participants and the second had 200 participants. We measured individuals’ perceived threat from mainland Chinese influences and feelings of mistrust in the government, and their strength of politicized identity. We then asked them whether they might engage in nonviolent or violent action in any future Hong Kong social unrest. Our findings showed that people with stronger feelings of politicized identity were more likely to say they would participate in both violent and nonviolent actions as part of any future social unrest. We also found that people who felt highly threatened by mainland Chinese influences and had less trust in Hong Kong political institutions felt a stronger politicized identity.
Our research shows that feelings of threat alongside a loss of trust in the government are related to whether communities erupt into protest. In particular, our findings also suggest why protests sometimes take a violent turn: this can happen when people have lost faith in their political institutions; and, most particularly, when they also feel like they are part of a protest movement. In these cases, individuals may be prepared to accept the risks of engaging in violent protest because they are highly committed to their cause and they have no other avenues for creating change. Given these processes, attempts to repress or punish protesters may help fuel, rather than curb, increased violent protest. A more beneficial approach for authorities experiencing violent protest may be to step away from punitive approaches. Instead, our findings suggest that reducing social unrest could be helped by authorities focusing their efforts on reducing perceived threat and earning their citizens’ trust. Enhancing citizens’ opportunities for political participation might be one approach to achieve both.
本研究以香港近年的政治狀況作背景, 調查外來威脅和對當權者的不信任如何影響人參與集體行動的意圖。 我們提出當人感受到的外來的威脅而且亦對當權者不信任, 他們的集體身分認同會有所影響, 繼而左右他們參與合法或暴力的社會運動的意圖。 研究一 (N = 398) 發現外來威脅、 對當權者的不信任和此兩因素的交互作用與參與社會運動中的集體行動的意圖有正面關係。 研究二 (N = 200) 此兩因素的交互作用與社會運動的身分認同亦有正面關係。 兩項研究皆指出外來威脅和對當權者不信任導致身分認同上的分別, 從而影響參與集體行動的意圖。 社會運動的身分認同和香港人身分認同與參與合法社會運動的意圖有直接關係。 反之, 各種因素中只有社會運動的身分認同與參與不合法甚至暴力 抗爭的意圖有直接關係。
Protests can involve an array of actions ranging from street marches and sit-ins to nonviolent blockades and violent attacks on police. Established action categories distinguish between normative collective action and nonnormative collective action (
Research has increasingly examined predictors of normative collective action, highlighting the important role collective identity plays in motivating this action type (
Scholars have suggested how group-based identities can be reinforced through participation in collective action (
Our study makes two novel contributions to the literature. First, we examined whether social threat from an outgroup and mistrust in the political system—and their interaction—are associated with politicized identity. Second, we examined the association of politicized identity with normative and violent collective action intentions in the context of Hong Kong’s social unrest.
The social identity model of collective action (
Furthermore, politicized identities (e.g., as a feminist or
According to
When a group’s resources and/or values are threatened by an outgroup, their tendency to act collectively to protect themselves may be heightened (e.g.,
Another source of threat during the study period may have resulted from the growing use of violence by police against protesters (
There is evidence that when perceived threat is high, low trust in the political system may increase politicized identification (
Building on this past research, we expect to find an association between political mistrust and participation in violent action for greater regional autonomy and democracy in Hong Kong. Given that social threat and political mistrust have been shown to influence collective action intentions, we expect the interaction of political mistrust and social threat to predict normative and violent action intentions via politicized identification.
Our research was conducted in Hong Kong in the aftermath of the 2014 Umbrella Movement and 2016 Fishball Revolution, and prior to the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement. The Umbrella Movement was ostensibly triggered by the demand for universal suffrage promised in the Basic Law. However, scholars and commentators attribute its precursor to the influx of mainland Chinese tourists and migrants to Hong Kong, which has escalated tensions between Hong Kong residents and mainlanders (
During the time of this study, Hong Kongers expressed considerable support for the calls for greater autonomy for Hong Kong, with support for localism and independence especially high among youth (
While the Umbrella Movement began as a nonviolent campaign, Hong Kong pro-democracy activists have increasingly used violent action to oppose the perceived increasing interference by the Chinese central government in the city’s political, economic, and social affairs and erosion of freedoms (
The goal of the present research was to examine the influence of social threat and political mistrust and their interaction as predictors of politicized identity (i.e., identification with the Hong Kong independence movement), and to examine their direct and indirect effects through politicized identity on normative and violent collective action. The existence of an active pro-democracy movement combined with political mistrust and perceived social threat provides a unique opportunity to study the influence of these factors on politicized identity, as well as normative and violent collective action. Results from this context would provide strong evidence for the robustness of the phenomenon; they would assist the understanding of the politicization of the Hong Kong identity in the context of the pro-democracy movement.
We argue that a high degree of politicized identity means that individuals are more willing to take actions that might entail a relatively high degree of risk, commitment, and self-investment (even extending to violent action, which was evident in the 2016 Fishball Revolution and the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill social unrest). In addition, we expected both broader ingroup identity (e.g., as a Hong Konger) and politicized identity to be positively associated with normative action. This is predicted because while normative action in Hong Kong after the introduction of the National Security Laws in 2020 may have had grave consequences, during the time of these studies, normative action generally involved less effort and risk (see also
Using the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement as the context, across two studies, we hypothesized that perceived social threat (H1a), political mistrust (H1b), and their interaction (H1c) would be positively associated with politicized identity. In turn, we hypothesized that politicized identity would be positively associated with both normative (H2a) and violent collective action (H2b). We further hypothesized that perceived social threat and political mistrust and their interaction would have an indirect effect (through politicized identity) on both normative (H3a) and violent collective action (H3b) Given that what is considered nonnormative might change over time and during the course of a protest (
Study 1 was conducted before and after a contentious election in Hong Kong for the city’s lawmakers (“The 2016 Legislative Council election”). Among the candidates were a number of pro-autonomy candidates, who were especially popular among young people (
Data for the present study was collected in August and September of 2016. Data was collected via an online survey that was publicized through mass email and recruitment posters as well as from The University of Hong Kong through campus-wide email and the participant pool system. Ethical approval from The University of Hong Kong was obtained prior to data collection.
Four hundred and sixty participants began the survey and provided informed consent. We excluded participants who did not meet the criteria of having been born in Hong Kong or lived there for more than seven years (
Participants completed an online questionnaire that assessed their politicized identification, identification as a Hong Konger, perceived social threat from mainland Chinese, political mistrust, and intentions to participate in normative and violent collective action.
Following
Perceived social threat from mainland Chinese was measured using an eight-item scale adapted from
Politicized identity was measured using three items adapted from
Identification with the broader ingroup was measured using the same items and rating scale used to measure politicized identity; “members of the Hong Kong Independence Movement” was replaced with “Hong Kong(er)” (e.g., “I see myself as a Hong Konger”; α = .84).
Participants were asked to indicate how likely they were to engage in certain activities as part of a future political movement in Hong Kong. Four items were chosen based on
Participants were asked to indicate how likely they were to engage in certain activities as part of a future political movement in Hong Kong. Three items were chosen based on In both Study 1 and Study 2, we conducted parallel analysis and CFA to evaluate the factor structure of the normative and violent collective action items. Across both studies, the parallel analysis suggested a two-factor solution; the CFAs also indicated that the two-factor solution was of good fit. Code and results can be found in the
All analyses were conducted in
We first tested the main and moderating effects of social threat and political mistrust on politicized identity. We then conducted a path analysis to examine the hypothesized relationships among the measured variables. We also tested the significance of the hypothesized effects using the lavaan package in R. Bootstrapping procedure was not employed, as it is not available for the MLR estimator in lavaan.
Descriptive results are reported in
Standardized path coefficients are presented in
Consistent with the hypotheses, broader ingroup identity (β = .178,
The indirect effects of perceived threat on normative (β = .052,
There was no significant interaction between social threat and political mistrust in the prediction of normative action intentions (β = .015,
A simple slope analysis revealed that social threat was a significant positive predictor of violent action intentions at high (+1
Broader ingroup identity was positively associated with normative (β = .166,
Study 1 examined the antecedents and consequences of identifying with the independence movement. Our hypotheses were partially supported: we found that social threat (H1a) and political mistrust (H1b), but not their interaction (H1c), were associated with politicized identity. Broader ingroup identification was also associated with politicized identity. Politicized identity was associated with both normative (H2a) and violent action intentions (H2b). However, broader ingroup identification was only significantly associated with normative action intentions (H3b), but not violent action intentions (H3c).
These findings support the contention that broader ingroup collective identity is insufficient for driving violent collective action. However, we found an indirect effect of broader Hong Kong identity with violent action via politicized identity. There was no inhibiting (negative) association of the broad social category identity with violent action as demonstrated in
Our findings also indicate that individuals who perceive high social threat or high political mistrust more strongly identify with both the politicized identity and broader ingroup. However, while direct associations were found, our hypothesized interaction effect of social threat and political mistrust on politicized identity was not supported. Put differently, threat and mistrust both independently bolstered politicized identity itself, but their interaction predicted violent action intentions. This study took place several months after the 2016 Fishball Revolution, which was largely anti-mainland Chinese, and at the time of a contentious election. The main effects of political mistrust and social threat might have been heightened and thus leaving less variance for their interaction to explain. To further examine this effect, we conducted a second study in a less eventful period. We also incorporated measures of efficacy and injustice that have been shown to mediate the link between politicized identity and collective action (e.g.,
In Study 2, we again tested the three hypotheses concerning the associations between social threat (H1a) and political mistrust (H1b), and their interaction (H1c), on politicized identity. Following Study 1, we included broader group identity as an antecedent of politicized identity and predictor of normative and violent action intentions.
In addition, we examined group efficacy and perceived injustice. These variables have underpinned the development of the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; van Zomeren, 2013), which suggests that collective action can be directly predicted through politicized identity, but also indirectly via group-based anger or injustice and group efficacy (
Following SIMCA, we hypothesized that politicized identity (H2a), perceived injustice (H2b), and group efficacy (H2c) would predict normative action. We argue that violent action should be positively associated with politicized identity (H3a) and perceived injustice (H3b): as these may provide a legitimizing narrative and potential motivation for violent acts. However, SIMCA has relatively little empirical evidence regarding the association between group efficacy and violent collective action. Some research indicates that violent action may result from low efficacy perceptions: that is, protesters resort to violence when there is little hope of achieving their goals (
The data collection was conducted between September and November in 2017. Ethical approval from The University of Hong Kong was obtained prior to data collection. Two hundred and thirty-three participants were recruited from the University of Hong Kong through campus-wide email and the participant pool system. They were entered into a lucky draw or given course credits as participation compensation. Participants who were not Hong Kong locals (
Participants were invited to complete an online questionnaire. We administered the same measures used in Study 1 to assess political mistrust (α = .76), social threat (α = .84), politicized identity (α = .94), broader ingroup identity (α = .85), as well as intentions to engage in normative (α = .86) and violent action (α = .87). In addition, we introduced the measures of perceived injustice and group efficacy in this study.
Perceived injustice was measured using a four-item scale adapted from
Group efficacy was measured using a two-item scale adapted from
Using the lavaan package ( See Footnote 3.
The mean and standard deviation of the variables are presented in
Correlations among measured variables are presented in
As hypothesized, broader group identity (β = .170,
Politicized identity had a significant positive association with both normative (β = .286, We also ran the model without the two additional variables introduced in Study 2 (i.e., perceived injustice and group efficacy). The code and results are included in the
Taken together, the results reveal significant indirect effects of broader ingroup identity on normative (β = .044,
In Study 2, we tested our original model with additional variables from SIMCA, namely perceived injustice and group efficacy. Our hypotheses were partially supported. Unlike in Study 1, we did not find a significant association of perceived social threat (H1a) and political mistrust (H1b) on politicized identity. However, our results yielded a significant interaction between the two predictors, suggesting that social threat and political mistrust play an important role in identity politicization (H1c). Those who felt both highly threatened by mainland Chinese influences and did not trust the political institutions of Hong Kong were more likely to identify with the independence movement, which in turn contributed to more conventional protest but also to violent protest choices.
Also similar to Study 1, the broader identity of Hong Konger was positively associated with politicized identity and normative collective action but not associated directly with violent action. Politicized identity had a significant positive association with both normative (H2a) and violent collective action (H2b). While we did not find positive associations between group efficacy and normative collective action (H2c), consistent with
Across two studies, we examined the extent to which perceived social threat from an outgroup and political mistrust predicts politicized identity and intentions to engage in normative and violent collective action. Using Hong Kong’s 2014 Umbrella Movement and the 2016 Fishball Revolution as a context, Study 1 found a small but significant association of perceived social threat (H1a) and political mistrust (H1b) on politicized identity. Study 2 found a small but significant interaction effect of perceived social threat and political mistrust on politicized identity (H1c). As hypothesized, politicized identity was associated with both normative (H2a) and violent collective action intentions (H2b) across both studies. In addition, Study 1 found the hypothesized indirect effect from perceived social threat and political mistrust to normative and violent collective action through politicized identity. Study 2 incorporated SIMCA measures and found the hypothesized indirect effect from the interaction of perceived social threat and political mistrust through politicized identity to normative (H2a) and violent collective action (H2a).
Taken together, our findings shed light on factors that may influence identity politicization. In Study 1, perceived social threat and political mistrust were associated with politicized identity, while in Study 2 their interaction was associated with politicized identity. Both variables indirectly predicted both normative and violent collective action intentions via politicised identity. However, while there was no evidence that these variables directly affect collective action intentions (cf.,
However, significant pathways between perceived threat and political mistrust were not consistent across both studies. The significant interaction of social threat and political mistrust on violent action in Study 1 was not replicated in Study 2. Rather, Study 2 showed an indirect relationship via politicised identification. Study 1 was undertaken during a time of high conflict salience and corresponding social unrest, whereas Study 2 was conducted during a period of relative calm. This is reflected in the data, with significantly lower average social threat and political mistrust perceptions for Study 2 participants (
Turning to the role of identity, our results indicate that politicized identity is a predictor of both normative and violent collective action intentions. This was supported in both studies, extending previous work examining the role of politicized identity (e.g.,
In Study 2, we also included SIMCA measures of group efficacy and injustice (
Conversely, efficacy was negatively associated with violent (but not normative) collective action. Our group efficacy measure sought to align with Hong Konger concerns regarding mainlandization; namely, the ability of Hong Kongers to influence public affairs and improve society. The limited political participation opportunities and the lack of concrete steps toward democratization or increase in autonomy resulting from the peaceful protests may help explain why this group efficacy measure was not associated with normative collective action. In this context, the null association of efficacy with normative collective action would be interpreted as showing that such action may be seen as symbolic rather than instrumentally linked to effecting change (
The findings suggest that those who intend to engage in violent collective actions may have lost belief in the power to effect change via normative action tactics, while still being highly driven to engage in collective action behaviours (
A growing body of research indicates that the specific nature of efficacy perceptions may be important in untangling the complex relationship between efficacy and normative and violent collective action. For example,
Taken together, these findings suggest fruitful avenues for future research on the antecedents and consequences of politicized identity. We suggest that these findings warrant future research examining causal effects of ingroup identity, politicized identity, and nonnormative actions. This research will help identify pathways to and from violent collective action, and the context in which beliefs about efficacy and injustice become encapsulated within politicized identities rather than independent predictors in their own right.
Although our analyses were guided by established theory and findings from prior research, the cross-sectional nature of our data does not allow us to establish causal relations between variables. It is also possible that the causal relationship between threat and politicized identity as well as mistrust and politicized is bi-directional in nature. It is therefore important for future studies to corroborate our findings with longitudinal and experimental data. Similarly, our group efficacy measure in Study 2 was at a lower level of specificity than other measures such as threat and political mistrust (
It is also important to note that our student sample may in general reflect a more anti-establishment, distrusting, and radical profile than the general population (
Finally, our analysis of the predictors of violent action was grounded in the situational context of Hong Kong, where protests increased the use of violence in response to political and police repression (
The present study makes a number of important contributions to the literature. Our findings are of particular interest given that research on the antecedents of nonnormative collective action primarily focuses on collective action within well-functioning democratic societies and on relatively low-risk, nonviolent action (
These results suggest that proponents of violent tactics could seek to increase perceptions of social threat and political mistrust to help build politicized identity, and in turn, increase support for violent collective action. But this tactic may also bring risks. Our study did not investigate the wider effects of increasing perceptions of social threat. Other research suggests increasing threat perceptions could exacerbate polarization between disadvantaged and advantaged groups and affect societal-wide responses such as increased support for authoritarianism (
The Hong Kong pro-democracy movement provides a unique opportunity to examine how normative protest can be transformed into violent collective action. By examining the antecedents of politicized identity, political mistrust, and perceived social threat, and exploring the links to violent collective action, the present research contributes to understanding the rise of violent mass movements, and the factors that might fuel them. Our findings are consistent with the view that increasing individuals’ politicized identity through manipulating perceptions of social threat and political mistrust may increase engagement in both normative and violent collective action. Conversely, when mistrust is low, threat may not only be less likely to mobilize politicized citizens, but also less likely to lead to violent collective action. Given the widespread use of violence in many past and present social movements, better understanding the processes which may influence the use of violent collective action is important both for social movement activists and their opponents. The question of how mistrust decreases (or increases) over time is a critical direction for future research and theorizing.
This work was supported by University Grants Committee of Hong Kong (RGC GRF Grant #17612718).
The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
The authors have no support to report.
For this article, a data set is freely available (
The Supplementary materials contain data, code, a codebook that includes all measures for both Study 1 and Study 2, and the Supplementary Tables (for access see