Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) holds that individuals derive part of their self-concept from group memberships, fostering a sense of belonging and self-esteem while motivating favorable ingroup evaluations (Aberson et al., 2000; Brown, 2000; Castano et al., 2002). These processes shape how historical events are remembered and interpreted within collective narratives, particularly in post-conflict contexts where the past is morally contested, and the ingroup is often portrayed as a rightful victim and the outgroup as a perpetrator (Gray & Wegner, 2009). Such identity-driven evaluations inform shared understandings of “what happened” and “who did what.” However, identity-protective distortions do not emerge consistently across all perpetrator contexts (Kazarovytska & Imhoff, 2023).

Self-Categorization Theory (Turner et al., 1987) explains how individuals shift between subordinate (e.g., religious) and superordinate (e.g., national) identities. Subordinate identities accentuate intergroup differences and ingroup suffering, whereas superordinate identities promote recognition of shared experiences and more reconciliatory understandings of collective violence (Čehajić et al., 2008; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Licata et al., 2012). These dynamics shape two key constructs: victimhood beliefs and intergroup responsibility attribution, which are distinct but complementary, especially in civil wars where victim and perpetrator roles overlap.

We use collective victimization to refer to processes and experiences of group-based harm, and collective victimhood beliefs to refer to comparative, identity-relevant judgments about who is a ‘victim’ (ingroup vs. outgroup). Recent theoretical developments increasingly use the term “collective victimization beliefs” to emphasize the dynamic, subjective construal of group-based harm (e.g., Vollhardt et al., 2026). In the present research, however, we focus more narrowly on comparative evaluations of victim status between former adversary groups—specifically, whether participants perceive their ingroup as more or less victimized than the outgroup. We therefore retain the term “collective victimhood beliefs” to reflect this evaluative and identity-relevant dimension of post-conflict memory.

Groups may adopt inclusive victim consciousness, recognizing shared suffering (Vollhardt, 2012), or competitive victimhood (CV), claiming greater suffering than others and sometimes denying outgroup harm (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, et al., 2008; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). CV serves identity needs: it protects perpetrators’ moral image, reinforces victims’ moral worth, and justifies social or political claims (Bilali & Vollhardt, 2019; Nadler & Shnabel, 2015; Shnabel et al., 2009).

Group members often draw on and reconstruct collective memories of conflict in identity-serving ways, which can sustain CV over time (Mukherjee et al., 2018; Rimé et al., 2015). When perceived ingroup victimization is central to personal identity, individuals are more likely to deny guilt, make exonerating attributions, and oppose conciliatory policies, thereby hindering reconciliation (Jeong et al., 2023; Noor et al., 2012). Such patterns reflect broader ingroup-favoring moral evaluation in intergroup contexts (Bagci et al., 2018; Bilali, 2014; Bilali et al., 2012).

In symmetrical conflicts, victim identities can obscure ingroup wrongdoing (Bilewicz & Stefaniak, 2013; Hirschberger et al., 2016). However, groups may also view themselves as both victims and perpetrators, reflecting the moral complexity of intergroup violence (SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014). Promoting shared victim or shared perpetrator identities can reduce CV and foster reconciliation (Shnabel et al., 2013).

Building on this logic, identification shapes CV. Identification with subordinate groups (religious/ethnic) heightens CV by reinforcing boundaries, whereas identification with superordinate (national) identities promotes more inclusive interpretations. For instance, Albanians in Kosovo who identified with a shared regional identity (“inhabitants of Kosovo”) reported lower CV (Andrighetto et al., 2012). Competitive victimhood predicts lower levels of forgiveness, trust, and compromise, whereas inclusive construals foster reconciliation (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; Vollhardt, 2012). Despite Lebanon’s layered religious and national identities, no study has yet examined these dynamics in this context.

We expect participants to perceive greater ingroup than outgroup victimhood (H1a), with this tendency increasing with religious identification (H1b) and decreasing with national identification (H1c). Overall, identification shapes how people construe collective violence, expressed here in competitive victimhood beliefs and intergroup responsibility attributions.

Beyond shaping victimhood beliefs, identity processes also shape how groups assign responsibility for violence. In intergroup conflicts, groups typically minimize or externalize their own culpability while accentuating others’ (Bandura, 1999; Bilali et al., 2019; Roccas et al., 2006; Rothschild et al., 2013). These attributions reflect motivated efforts to preserve a positive moral image and maintain group cohesion under moral threat, with denial and blame-shifting serving as key defensive strategies (Leidner & Castano, 2012; Lickel et al., 2006; Roccas et al., 2006; White & Branscombe, 2019). Collective memory reinforces these dynamics by foregrounding ingroup suffering and downplaying ingroup agency in harm-doing (Rimé et al., 2015). When victimhood is central to identity, individuals are especially likely to deny guilt and offer exonerating accounts of ingroup behavior (Jeong et al., 2023).

Blaming third parties further protects identity and cohesion, particularly in multi-actor conflicts (Bilali, 2013). In Lebanon, responsibility is often attributed to external actors such as Syria or Israel (Haugbolle, 2010; Licata et al., 2012). Evidence supports this logic: highly identified Turkish participants attributed more responsibility for the Armenian genocide to outgroups and third parties (Bilali et al., 2012), and similar effects emerged in Holocaust remembrance in Hungary (Hirschberger et al., 2016). Strong subgroup identification tends to heighten defensive attributions, whereas superordinate national identification can reduce them and promote reconciliation (Čehajić et al., 2008). Accordingly, we expect participants to attribute more responsibility to the outgroup and third parties than to their ingroup (H2a). This pattern should increase with stronger religious identification (H2b) and decrease with stronger national identification (H2c).

The Lebanese Civil War offers a context in which overlapping religious and national identities make identity-based interpretations of violence particularly salient. Lebanon officially recognizes 18 sects and is predominantly Muslim (65%) and Christian (35%) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2022). Although rooted in political and socioeconomic inequalities rather than purely religious divisions, the war (1975–1990) crystallized around the Christian–Muslim divide and evolved into a multi-actor conflict shaped by shifting domestic alliances and foreign interventions (Corm, 1986; Salibi, 1988). External actors such as Syria and Israel remain salient in public discourse and are frequently treated as a coherent third-party category (Licata et al., 2012).

Before the war, Christians (particularly Maronites) held disproportionate political power under the 1943 National Pact. During the conflict, power shifted as Muslim factions gained military strength, and later, new asymmetries emerged with Hezbollah’s rise and continued foreign influence (Abul-Husn, 1998; Corm, 1986; Harik, 1996). Although both sides engaged in violence, the conflict was never truly symmetrical; relative power and privilege varied across periods and factions, shaped by domestic alliances and foreign interventions. All major sectarian factions both suffered large-scale victimization and engaged in violence. No group can be meaningfully classified as purely a victim or a perpetrator. This ambivalence makes Lebanon especially suitable for examining how groups construe ingroup victimhood relative to others and assign responsibility for harm.

The war’s 15-year span ended with the Taif Agreement, followed by a general amnesty that blurred distinctions between victims and aggressors under the ethos of “no victor, no vanquished.” While intended to foster reconciliation, the amnesty prevented the emergence of a unified national narrative, leaving community-specific memories that continue to fuel sectarian tensions (Haugbolle, 2010). These fragmented narratives make Lebanon a compelling context for studying how people construe past violence.

We conducted two studies to examine how members of former adversary groups construe violence and assign victim status and responsibility, focusing on the roles of national and religious identification.

Although Lebanon recognizes 18 sects, political life is organized around two higher-order confessional blocs: Christian (e.g., Maronite, Greek Orthodox) and Muslim (e.g., Sunni, Shia, Druze). Despite their theological and political differences, these groups formed wartime alliances and remain institutionalized in the postwar power-sharing system (Abul-Husn, 1998; Corm, 1986; Salibi, 1988). We therefore operationalized group membership at this broader level. Building on Licata et al. (2012), who focused solely on one denomination (Maronite Christians), our research aimed to compare the two religious groups to provide a more comprehensive understanding of identity-based construals of violence in Lebanon.

Both studies adopted a narrative-based approach, presenting brief, structured accounts of past conflicts. Such narratives mirror how collective memories are socially transmitted and are known to activate identity-based moral reasoning (László, 2013; Liu & Hilton, 2005). In our studies, we used standardized narratives to model these memory frames experimentally, allowing us to examine how identity shapes judgments of victimhood and responsibility under identical informational conditions. Prior research shows that emphasizing ingroup suffering reduces perceived culpability, whereas highlighting ingroup harm-doing elicits defensiveness (Wohl et al., 2006). For example, Bilali (2012) found that participants judged their group’s violence as more justifiable when reminded of its past suffering, underscoring that moral reactions depend on whether the ingroup is portrayed as victim or perpetrator. Accordingly, Study 1 integrated ingroup suffering and harm-doing within single narratives, whereas Study 2 presented them separately, allowing us to test how narrative structure shapes moral judgment and responsibility attribution.

By integrating collective memory and social identity frameworks within a multi-actor conflict, this research extends theories of collective victimhood and responsibility attribution to a complex real-world setting. Together, the studies offer a contextually grounded analysis of how identity shapes interpretations of violence in post-conflict societies.

As researchers, including two Lebanese from different religious communities, we are mindful of how our positionality shapes this work and have engaged in ongoing reflexivity to ensure an inclusive interpretation.

Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the main study variables and the zero-order correlations for both groups. A mixed ANOVA indicated stronger identification with the Lebanese nation than with religious groups, F(1, 403) = 350.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .47, with no interaction with religious group membership, F(1, 403) = 0.001, p = .970, ηp2 = .00.

Study 1 provided partial support for our hypotheses. Although participants did not display a clear ingroup-favoring pattern in victimhood beliefs (suggesting comparable recognition of groups’ suffering rather than competitive victimhood), high religious identifiers attributed greater responsibility to the outgroup and to third parties than to their own group, consistent with previous research linking strong ingroup identification to defensive attributions (e.g., Bandura, 1999; Bilali et al., 2012; Licata et al., 2012). By contrast, low religious identifiers attributed more responsibility to third parties than to either the ingroup or the outgroup. This consistent tendency to blame external actors reflects Lebanon’s long-standing narrative of external interference. Overall, the findings indicate that although religious identity still shapes moral evaluations of the past, there is also evidence of mutual acknowledgment of suffering that may signal early steps toward inclusive victimhood.

However, this study has several limitations. The mixed presentation of events, depicting both ingroup suffering and harm-doing, may have reduced the specificity of ratings of victimhood and responsibility. Moreover, placing the identification scales after the historical narratives and on the same page may have influenced responses through priming or comparison effects. These limitations are addressed in Study 2.

Tables 2 and 3 display means and standard deviations for the main variables and zero-order correlations for both groups after exposure to the ingroup perpetrator event and the ingroup victimization event. A mixed ANOVA again showed stronger identification with the Lebanese nation than with religious groups, F(1, 336) = 166.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .33, with no interaction with religious group membership, F(1, 336) = 0.00, p = .968, ηp2 < .01, consistent with Study 1.

Study 2 extended Study 1 by presenting participants with specific civil war events depicting their ingroup as either a victim or a perpetrator, allowing us to examine how event framing and identification jointly shape interpretations of past violence.

Unlike Study 1, which found no ingroup-outgroup differences in victimhood, Study 2 revealed clear ingroup-favoring victimhood, particularly following an ingroup victimization event. This pattern was strongest among highly religious identifiers, consistent with expectations and supporting the role of religious identification in reinforcing competitive victimhood beliefs (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). Unexpectedly, these effects were amplified among participants high in both religious and national identification, rather than among those high in religious but low in national identification.

Responsibility attributions showed a similar overall pattern: participants assigned more responsibility to outgroups and third parties than to their ingroup, especially when religious identification was strong, as in Study 1. The event type further qualified this pattern. When the ingroup was portrayed as a perpetrator, participants low in both religious and national identification attributed more responsibility to the ingroup than to the outgroup. In contrast, highly religious participants, regardless of national identification level, displayed more symmetrical responsibility attributions between groups. This partially supports H2d, suggesting that religious identification heightened defensiveness primarily by minimizing ingroup–outgroup differentiation rather than by directly displacing blame. Contrary to expectations, strong national identification did not attenuate this defensiveness, and no effects of group membership emerged.

Together, these results highlight how identity salience and event framing jointly shape moral interpretations of conflict, reinforcing collective defensiveness in post-conflict memory.

Victimhood effects emerged primarily in Study 2. When reminded of their group’s past suffering, participants attributed greater ingroup than outgroup victimhood, particularly those high in religious identification. This suggests that strong religious identifiers sought to defend their group’s moral image when confronted with threatening narratives, consistent with identity-driven moral reasoning and selective memory (Bandura, 1999; Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Bilali et al., 2012; Leidner & Castano, 2012; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; Noor et al., 2012; Rothschild et al., 2013; Sahdra & Ross, 2007).

Contrary to expectations, national identification did not offset the defensiveness associated with religious identification. Participants high in religious identification showed similar patterns of ingroup victimhood regardless of their level of national identification. This challenges common ingroup identity models (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), which posit that superordinate identities reduce ingroup-favoring patterns, and suggests that in Lebanon, where national identity is historically intertwined with sectarian narratives (Salibi, 1988), superordinate identification may lack the integrative force assumed in other contexts. Positive correlations between national and religious identification nonetheless point to complex identity configurations in internal religious–ethnic conflicts.

Across samples, ingroup and outgroup victimhood were positively correlated, indicating some capacity for inclusive victimhood (Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015). Recognizing shared suffering can foster empathy and reconciliation, suggesting that interventions emphasizing mutual loss may be effective. Research on historical perspective-taking (Bilali & Vollhardt, 2013) shows that acknowledging outgroup suffering can evoke empathy and moral reflection without requiring the denial or minimization of one’s own group’s suffering, an approach well suited to Lebanon’s fragmented memory landscape.

Responsibility attributions reflected both defensive and integrative tendencies. Across both studies, participants attributed more responsibility to the religious outgroup and, even more, to third parties than to their own group, consistent with identity-protective and moral disengagement strategies (Bandura, 1999; Bilali et al., 2012; Roccas et al., 2006). As expected, religious identification amplified this ingroup-favoring tendency (Study 1), suggesting that moral defensiveness intensifies with the salience of religious identity (Noor et al., 2012; Rothschild et al., 2013).

In Study 2, event type further qualified these patterns. When reminded of their group’s past victimization, highly religious participants (regardless of national identification level) increased outgroup blame. By contrast, when confronted with ingroup harm-doing, they shifted toward symmetrical responsibility attributions, minimizing differences between groups. Thus, strong religious identification did not simply increase blame; it promoted flexible defensiveness—externalizing responsibility when identity-congruent and adopting moral equivalence when acknowledging ingroup wrongdoing was unavoidable (Shnabel et al., 2013). Participants low in both religious and national identification, however, were more likely to acknowledge ingroup responsibility under harm-doing conditions, suggesting greater responsiveness to narrative content than to identity concerns (Bilali et al., 2019). Together, these patterns indicate that identification strength shapes not only who is blamed but also the structure of responsibility judgments (symmetrical vs. asymmetrical) in post-conflict contexts, thereby refining models of moral reasoning and responsibility attribution in multi-actor conflicts.

Contrary to expectations, national identification neither mitigated nor uniquely amplified religious defensiveness. Rather, it appeared largely neutral in shaping responsibility attributions among highly religious participants. In the Lebanese context, where national identity has historically been articulated through selective and contested narratives (Salibi, 1988), such patterns suggest that dual identification may coexist with moral symmetry rather than promote accountability. While this symmetrical framing may reduce overt blame and support coexistence, it can also obscure responsibility, highlighting the limits of identity-based integration for fostering deeper reconciliation.

Third-party blame was particularly salient. Across both studies, external actors were consistently assigned the greatest responsibility, surpassing both ingroup and outgroup blame. This mirrors Lebanon’s broader public discourse, which often frames the conflict as externally instigated rather than domestically driven. Our results thus position third-party blame as a double-edged narrative: while such narratives preserve ingroup virtue and can temporarily strengthen national cohesion, they deflect accountability and constrain moral repair (Bilali, 2013; Licata et al., 2012).

The absence of group-membership effects suggests that categorical religious affiliation alone does not structure moral interpretations of the Lebanese civil war. This convergence is further supported by the finding that Christian and Muslim participants did not differ in their relative levels of national versus religious identification, suggesting comparable identity configurations across groups. This may reflect the conflict’s shifting perpetrator–victim roles, which blur moral boundaries across groups, as well as the dominance of identification strength over group category in shaping motivated reasoning. Moreover, decades of post-war silence and shared narratives emphasizing external responsibility may have fostered convergent collective memory frames among Christians and Muslims, reducing divergence in responsibility and victimhood judgments. At the institutional level, Lebanon’s post-war amnesty law exemplifies this dynamic. By attributing the war’s causes to foreign interference, it reduced immediate tensions yet hindered the formation of a shared national narrative and long-term collective memory work (Staub, 2006).

Although rooted in Lebanon’s history, the persistence of religious identification as a moral anchor (and the defensiveness it produces) likely generalizes to other post-conflict settings where religion and politics intertwine (e.g., Bosnia, Northern Ireland). The potential for inclusive victimhood and shared responsibility may characterize multi-actor conflicts in which no group holds absolute moral authority. By contrast, the overlap between national and religious identification is context-specific, reflecting Lebanon’s confessional system and uneven representation. A similar pattern has been documented in Northern Ireland, where national and religious identities remain intertwined and selectively inclusive even after political settlements (Muldoon et al., 2007). The prominence of third-party blame, framing domestic conflict as externally driven, may also extend to societies shaped by colonial or proxy-war legacies, where external involvement continues to influence collective memory (Bilali et al., 2012; Čehajić‐Clancy & Bilewicz, 2020).

Our convenience sample limits generalizability, and future work should recruit more socioeconomically diverse participants to better capture variation in war memories and identity positions. Moreover, our single-item victimhood measures capture perceived asymmetries but do not fully reflect the multidimensional constructs of competitive versus inclusive victimhood. Our findings should therefore be interpreted as addressing relative judgments of victim status in this context rather than the full breadth of comparative victim belief dimensions. Future research should employ validated multi-item scales. Given the sensitivity of responsibility judgments in polarized settings, self-report measures may underestimate defensiveness. Behavioral, implicit, or experimental methods could detect subtler forms of identity protection. Moreover, the difficulty of isolating victimization and perpetration reflects a real-world feature of intergroup conflict: collective memories are relational and cyclical, shaped by contested narratives and mutual interpretations of harm (Bilali, 2012; Licata et al., 2007). Qualitative or mixed-method designs could better capture how participants themselves construct meaning around such events.

Future research should test whether counter-narratives highlighting outgroup victimization can foster reconciliation. Our results suggest openness to inclusive victimhood (Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015) and that victimhood beliefs are malleable: individuals capable of ingroup-favoring attributions also recognize shared losses. Experimental interventions using testimonials or media could examine whether acknowledging outgroup suffering enhances empathy and reduces defensiveness. Building on historical perspective-taking (Bilali & Vollhardt, 2013) and work on managing competing collective memories (Licata et al., 2007), initiatives in Lebanon, such as dialogue, education, or media, may promote more balanced moral appraisals and readiness for reconciliation. Longitudinal designs should further investigate how identity salience, narrative framing, and moral reasoning interact over time. Integrating identity theory with perspective-taking interventions can clarify how inclusive collective memories emerge and how they may help repair divisions in Lebanon and comparable societies.

Our studies show that religious identification continues to shape moral interpretations of Lebanon’s civil-war past, fostering selective memory and defensive attributions (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; Rothschild et al., 2013). Although national identification remains widely endorsed, it neither counteracts nor consistently attenuates these ingroup-favoring patterns, suggesting limits to its capacity to serve as a unifying framework. Yet the coexistence of ingroup-favoring patterns with recognition of shared suffering reveals a capacity for inclusive remembrance, in which group members acknowledge shared losses and accountability.

By showing how identity strength and narrative framing jointly shape post-conflict interpretations, this research advances understanding of collective memory in morally ambiguous conflicts. It highlights the enduring influence of religious identity, the limits of national identity as a unifying framework, and the ambivalent role of third-party blame in sustaining or softening intergroup divisions.