Affective polarisation (AP) refers to a pattern of political attitudes resulting from the tendency to feel warmly (affinity) towards one’s own political camp and coldly (animosity) towards its opponents (Iyengar et al., 2012; McCoy et al., 2018). Beyond affect towards the parties as institutions, these sentiments can be further differentiated by measuring affect towards parties’ leaders (vertical AP) or voters (horizontal AP). These various dimensions are interrelated and may even reinforce one another (Reiljan et al., 2024), affecting the way citizens act and interact, potentially reinforcing political conflicts and influencing everyday social interactions (Iyengar et al., 2019; Torcal et al., 2025).

Despite affective polarisation becoming increasingly relevant in many democracies (Gidron et al., 2020), its emotional mechanisms remain underexplored, leading researchers to call for the inclusion of emotions to expand our understanding of their dynamics, patterns and consequences (Bakker & Lelkes, 2024; Huber et al., 2015; Huddy et al., 2015; Mason, 2016). Responding to this gap in the literature, this article focuses on discrete emotions towards political elites to deepen our understanding of how emotions relate to affective polarisation. Although recent research has explored emotions towards partisan groups and their impact on partisan affect (Berntzen et al., 2024; Kretchner et al., 2026; Renström et al., 2023), the role of emotions directed specifically at leaders has been insufficiently explored. Among potential emotional targets, political leaders are especially salient, eliciting strong emotional reactions (Hogg, 2001; McLaughlin et al., 2020; Ruben & Gigliotti, 2016), which could end up serving as proxies for how people feel about their partisan supporters.

In the following pages, I examine how five discrete emotions (hope, pride, anger, fear and disgust) towards leaders correlate with partisan AP (in-partisan affinity and out-partisan animosity). This approach seeks to fill in some of the gap surrounding the connection between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of AP. Following a set of hypotheses that assume emotions towards leaders generally align with broader evaluations of their party, I show that hope and pride towards one’s preferred leader are strongly correlated with liking in-partisans, while anger and disgust towards opponents are generally associated with disliking out-partisans. At the same time, I also control for the possibility of affectively incongruent emotional structures, such as negative emotions towards liked leaders and positive emotions towards disliked leaders. In addition, I control for individuals’ ideological extremity, partisan identification and political interest, since political engagement and motivated reasoning may influence partisan affect. Also, to test whether certain social groups are more prone to polarisation through exposure to inflammatory narratives I control for age, sex, education level and subjective wellbeing.

Although previous research has studied the effects of emotions towards political leaders on partisan affect in particular cases (Bakker & Lelkes, 2024; McLaughlin et al., 2020), I extend this analysis to five multiparty contexts in traditionally underexplored regions, across Latin America and Southern Europe (Argentina, Chile, Italy, Portugal and Spain), which vary in institutional structure, levels of polarisation and party competition, but at the same time show similar signs of partisan division. Cross-national survey data (TRI-POL; Torcal et al., 2023) allows us to observe patterns across varying contexts, enhancing the generalisability of findings while also highlighting contextual variation, showing that the relationship between emotions towards leaders and AP can take various forms depending on the emotional and political landscape. Overall, based on the distinct profiles of discrete emotions, findings may help frame why affective polarisation could be considered both a threat and an asset to democratic functioning.

I plot the coefficients for emotions towards leaders on levels of in-partisan affinity and out-partisan animosity by valence (Figure 1) and by discrete emotion (Figures 2 and 3) (full models ESM Tables C1-C2). I include multiple emotional states towards in- and out-party leaders to reflect the idea that multiple emotions can be felt simultaneously, even when seemingly contradictory (Roseman, 2025). The Electronic Supplementary Materials also include regressions pooling data from all five countries (ESM Table C3) and plots for the identity-conflicting emotions (ESM Figures C1-C2).

Before turning to the main results, Figure 1 shows the association between the valence of emotions felt towards in- and out-party leaders with partisan affect. These models provide a general overview of how the five emotions studied here should be expected to correlate with partisan affect based on their valence, by country. Minor deviations in the association of discrete emotions with respect to the general pattern support the view that discrete emotions can offer additional insights into the complex nature of affect, despite the valence of an emotion indicating whether experiences are consistent with one’s motives (Roseman, 2025).

Overall, these models show that positive-valence emotions towards in-party leaders are consistently associated with in-partisan affinity, but only conditionally linked to out-partisan animosity. The latter may depend on the degree of distinctiveness or explicit rivalry between individuals’ most- and least-liked parties (Nicholson et al., 2018), which may also respond to regional considerations within countries. Similarly, negative-valence emotions towards the out-leader are systematically associated with out-partisan animosity, but only with in-partisan affinity in the case of Spain and in the pooled sample (but note that the larger N may inflate statistical significance, and results should be taken as descriptive rather than inferential).

Figure 2 disaggregates positive emotions towards in-party leaders into hope and pride. Results show that in-partisan affinity is consistently associated with both hope and pride towards the in-party’s leader, although effects are negligible for out-partisan animosity, mirroring findings in Figure 1.

While coefficients appear similar for affinity, and are only weakly related to animosity, a small positive effect of in-leader hope on in-partisan animosity is found in the pooled sample. Although this may partly be due to the large sample size obtained by pooling, this effect is not found in the case of pride. This may indicate that hope in in-party leaders is inherently bounded, as it does not extend pro-sociality to out-partisans; if it did, one would expect lower levels of out-party animosity – if anything, it may even be weakly associated with higher out-party dislike. Conversely, the association between in-leader pride and out-partisan animosity appears more mixed, with a non-significant pooled effect nearing 0. Indeed, results are only significant in Italy, where the negative coefficient suggests that, in some cases, individuals who experience pride towards political leaders may tend to have a more positive view of their political landscape, thereby correlating with lower out-party animosity; or, put differently, those who evaluate out-partisans more positively exhibit lower levels of in-leader pride.

Figure 3 distinguishes between anger, fear and disgust towards out-party leaders. Despite similarities with Figure 1 – negative emotions towards the out-leader correlate strongly with out-partisan animosity but only weakly with in-partisan affinity – disaggregating the emotions yields distinct patterns. As Figure 3 suggests, while these are all negative-valence emotions and responses to perceived threat (Renström et al., 2023; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), we intuitively differentiate them beyond just valence (Scherer, 2003).

Specifically, while out-leader disgust is consistently associated with out-partisan animosity across all cases, the relationship appears more context-dependent for anger, and especially for fear. Figure 3 shows that anger is significantly associated with out-partisan animosity in all countries except Chile, whereas fear is only significant in Chile. This pattern suggests that different political contexts may condition which threat-related emotions become most salient. One possible explanation lies in the distinction between fear and anger identified by Lerner and Keltner (2001), particularly regarding perceptions of control and temporal orientation: future threats and uncertainty may trigger fear, while violations already committed may trigger anger. Fieldwork in Chile occurred roughly a year after the referendum, when the conditions of the new constitution were under negotiation; as such, political discourse centred on the uncertain and contested constitutional reform process, potentially framing partisan conflict as a future-oriented and institutionally mediated threat: “Facing immoral but overwhelmingly powerful authorities tends to elicit emotions such as fear … that sap anger” (Roseman, 2025, p. 12). By contrast, disgust remains comparatively stable across contexts, suggesting that moralised rejection of political opponents may operate more independently of shifting political conditions and institutional contexts. Moreover, despite having received scant attention in the AP literature, out-leader disgust is also linked to in-party bonding, as evidenced by higher levels of in-partisan affinity in Spain.

Figures 2 and 3 thus resemble but also qualify the general patterns observed in Figure 1: (1) positive-valence emotion appeared to correlate with higher out-partisan animosity in Spain, Chile and in the pooled data, but results were only significant for hope in the pooled regression; (2) the correlation between negative emotions and out-partisan animosity was generally non-significant for fear, which was hidden in the valence model; (3) the valence model showed a correlation between negative emotions and in-partisan affinity in Spain and in the pooled data, which the discrete models only confirmed for disgust in Spain. In addition, the valence models obscured the finding that in Italy in-leader pride was correlated with lower out-partisan animosity. Although differences were minor, AIC and BIC comparing these two model specifications (ESM Tables D7-D8) tended to support the discrete model over the valence model, especially in the case of out-partisan animosity, where discrete emotions behaved more heterogeneously.

Beyond the main results, additional findings are worth reporting. First, exploratory analyses of identity-incongruent emotions (ESM Tables C1-C3), included as controls, suggest that emotions contradicting partisan identities are in some cases linked to lower levels of AP, aligning with research on partisan ambivalence (Lavine et al., 2012). Specifically, fear and disgust towards one’s in-leader were associated with lower in-partisan affinity and out-partisan animosity both, although effects were context-dependent. Likewise, out-leader hope was linked to lower in-partisan affinity in Argentina. In addition, anger towards in-party leaders shows no relationship with partisan evaluations; and out-leader pride, a seemingly contradictory concept, was generally unrelated to partisan affect, with the notable exception of Chile, where out-leader pride was associated with higher out-partisan animosity, potentially reflecting a temporary misalignment between party labels and leaders’ positions during the referendum, such that leaders of disliked parties may have temporarily elicited goal-congruent reactions among their opponents. Finally, a consistent negative effect of hope towards the out-leader on animosity towards out-partisans was discovered in the regression coefficients for every single country, suggesting that differences in hope towards political leaders are a key factor in (partisan) AP.

Second, control variables behaved as expected, but highlight different dynamics across dimensions of AP. Ideological extremity and partisan identification are both strong and consistent predictors of in-partisan affinity, with coefficients sometimes even exceeding those of emotions towards in-party leaders. By contrast, only ideological extremity shows a somewhat consistent relationship with out-partisan animosity, with smaller coefficients. This suggests that while strong in-party attachment is concentrated among ideological extremes, out-party dislike is more evenly distributed across society, as partisan identification is not linked to out-partisan animosity. Finally, although both models did an adequate job predicting partisan AP, the out-partisan animosity model had a slightly weaker explanatory power, meaning that much of the variance is still unaccounted for.

I also estimated several alternative specifications to assess robustness. Identity congruence models (ESM Tables D1-D2) included only emotions aligned with partisan expectations, and produce similar results but tend to inflate some of the findings, likely due to omitted emotion categories that reflect partisan ambivalence. Identity-targeted models (ESM Tables D3-D4), included for completeness, only estimated emotions towards the relevant leader, performed less well and yielded less stable estimates. Ultimately, the main models (ESM Tables C1-C3) provide the best balance between parsimony and explanatory power, capturing variation that more constrained models overlook. Thus, while cross-party correlations remain weak, how we feel about one party’s leader(s) may be, albeit minimally, linked to how we feel about the supporters of another party, even in multiparty systems, where parties may be less directly opposed.

Finally, I examine temporal dynamics using lagged models (ESM Tables D7-D16). Due to data limitations (lagging drops first-wave observations and respondents with limited panel participation) and the potential for sample bias, these models are presented as robustness checks rather than core analyses to avoid overfitting. While results should be interpreted with caution, they are directionally consistent with the main findings, suggesting that earlier emotional responses may also predict subsequent partisan evaluations.

This study examined affective polarisation through discrete emotions attributed to political leaders. I show that discrete emotions may refine valence-based accounts of AP, although valence remains a useful indicator of AP: it captures what is arguably the most stable attribute of affective experience (Barrett, 2006). Consistent with this, the valence-based models broadly reflect the main patterns observed in the data; however, they also gloss over important differences by collapsing distinct emotional states of similar valence into a single evaluative continuum. Even though affect is generally understood as a complex phenomenon composed of multiple dimensions (Fontaine et al., 2007; Marcus, 2000; Marcus et al., 2000), theories considering conceptual dimensions such as valence, arousal, attribution, action tendencies, and so on, may remain overly abstract for survey instruments designed for lay audiences. Conversely, discrete emotions remain intuitive categories that capture these dimensions and which respondents can easily grasp (Scherer, 2003). While positive-valence experiences towards in-party leaders consistently correlated with in-partisan affinity and negative experiences towards out-party leaders correlated with out-partisan animosity, modelling emotions according to discrete states reveals additional structure. Rather than overturning valence-based findings, emotions qualify them, offering a more fine-grained account of how AP operates.

Within these broader patterns, different emotions point to different types of intergroup dynamics. Hope, associated with beneficial appraisals of uncertain future circumstances, is linked to affinity but remains sensitive to whom it is attributed to (Cohen-Chen & Pliskin, 2025): in-leader hope relates to stricter partisan boundaries, while out-leader hope relates to softer boundaries. Pride, a “self-enhancing”, “feel-good, do-bad” emotion, is usually associated with hierarchical views of society that favour the in-group/party (Cohen-Chen et al., 2020; Tracy et al., 2023); even when experienced towards unexpected actors, it does not seem to improve evaluations of outsider groups, reflecting recent actions without necessarily altering future expectations. Anger, associated with high control and approach-oriented responses (confrontation and conflict), is generally linked to partisan animosity (Webster, 2020), and is unrelated to partisan evaluations when attributed to one’s own leader. Fear, associated with uncertainty and perceived low control, aligns more closely with avoidance, and seems conditionally linked to animosity: the threat eliciting the emotion should be seen as beyond the individual’s ability to control (Roseman, 2025). Disgust, in turn, stands out as a particularly robust predictor of out-partisan animosity across countries, independent of institutional contexts. This is notable given that disgust remains relatively understudied in the AP literature, although it has played an important role in other literatures, such as moral intergroup conflict (Hodson & Costello, 2007), given its consequences for moral judgement, social exclusion and “othering” processes (Redlawsk, 2023; Rozin et al., 2008). Unlike anger (a response to past transgressions), disgust is tied to perceptions of who/what others inherently are (Roseman, 2025), making it especially relevant for more social aspects of AP: it is associated with avoidance-oriented responses similar to fear, but also with dehumanisation and entrenched intergroup boundaries. In particular, the importance of each specific emotion may vary according to which aspects of AP are being considered. Taken together, these findings suggest that similar valence of affect may correspond to qualitatively different forms of AP.

This paper has also empirically highlighted the idea that different elements factor into partisan affinities and animosities, consistent with research showing that positive and negative partisanship are related but distinct (Abramowitz & Webster, 2018; Bankert, 2022). This is firstly shown in the role of different emotional states, which show almost no cross-effects: positive emotions towards in-party leaders are strongly linked to in-partisan affinity but have little bearing on out-partisan animosity, while negative emotions towards out-party leaders primarily map onto hostility towards out-partisans. Similarly, the relevance of key political covariates varies depending on which dimension of partisan AP is considered, with in-partisan affinity being more strongly related to individuals’ political extremity and degree of partisan identification. These asymmetries reinforce the need to model the two forms of partisanship separately (Bankert, 2022).

In addition, while emotions are known to be context-dependent, varying across national contexts (Russell, 2009), I conclude that institutional changes may potentially upset partisan affective dynamics. For instance, contrary to findings in all other countries, in the context of Chile’s 2021 plebiscite for constitutional reform, where some leaders supported options contrary to policy positions typically associated with their party, out-partisan animosity was associated with fear rather than anger, suggesting a shift in the type of threat perceived, potentially moving from confrontation to avoidance-based dynamics. Salient threats here may have been more institutionalised and future-oriented, with uncertainty and powerlessness playing a larger role than past grievances (Roseman, 2025). The temporal and institutional aspects of political appraisals also appear to differentiate experiences of hope (uncertain, future-oriented) and pride (recent actions) towards out-party leaders in Chile, suggesting that despite leaders sometimes acting in ways that are consistent with rival voters’ motives, out-party categorisations and feelings remain stable, and require more consistent positive expectations of future actions to reduce negative party evaluations. The case of Chile suggests that political emotions and affective polarisation may be vulnerable to institutional dynamics.

In this article, I have argued that measurements of AP that rely only on valence may be mired in overly abstract views of this phenomenon. This partly relates to the ongoing discussion around whether AP poses a threat to democratic functioning (Kokkonen & Harteveld, 2025): while researchers may be more sophisticated than lay audiences, measurements of AP that consider a fuller view of affective experiences will have an easier time disentangling the negative and positive aspects of polarisation. Specifically, in this research it becomes clear that disgust matters for AP, but likely more for evaluations of partisan voters than it would for voting behaviour, where anger and hope likely remain more relevant. Thus, research concerned with the social aspects of polarisation and how these may relate to cohesion and other elements central to democratic functioning (Torcal & Thomson, 2023; Torcal et al., 2025) should be concerned with disgust as problematic and disregard in-leader anger, which is wholly unrelated to partisan evaluations. Views of hope as a potential strategy for depolarisation should bear in mind that it likely needs to be attributed to out-parties, and this may require more broad, cross-cutting appeals rather than one-sided discourse and policies.

Ultimately, the findings underscore that political emotions are not interchangeable. Even when they share valence, they reflect different appraisals of threat and opportunity, and imply different behavioural orientations. By incorporating discrete emotions into the study of affective polarisation, this paper shows that we can move beyond simple like-dislike evaluations in order to gain a clearer understanding of how partisan divisions are experienced, maintained and, potentially, mitigated.