We conceptualise utopianism to be the tendency to engage in the act of imagining an ideal form of society (see Fernando et al., 2018) and measure it in terms of both self-reported frequency of engagement in thinking about an ideal society and a positive attitude towards doing so. Conceptually, an ideal society implies that it is different from, and in some sense better, than the society as it currently is, i.e., the status quo. Utopian theorists (e.g., Davis, 1983; Levitas, 1990) have noted that imagining a better society may prompt a rejection of the status quo and an orientation towards social change. This notion has been supported by research showing a negative relationship between utopianism and satisfaction with one’s existing society, as well as a positive relationship between utopianism and social change motivation (Fernando et al., 2018). It follows that, in general, utopianism will trend in the direction away from the status quo.

However, the direction in which utopianism would drive people depends on how they perceive the status quo to be vis a vis their ideal society. Those on the left of politics may regard the status quo as too right-leaning and try to change their society in the direction of a left-wing utopia; however, right-wing utopians may find the same status quo too left-leaning and try to change their society in the direction of a right-wing utopia. Therefore, utopianism, as we define it here, is theoretically agnostic as to the content of that utopian vision.

Our research question here is whether utopianism – an orientation to change the status quo in the direction of an ideal society – is empirically associated with the political left or right. Understanding the relationship between utopianism and political orientation has the potential to inform us about both constructs. First, we can gain an understanding of the kinds of utopian visions that are likely to be pursued within a given society. If, for example, people on the left of politics engage more in utopian thinking, more left-leaning social movements are likely to catalyse action for change given the observed relationship between utopian thinking and motivation for change (Fernando et al., 2018). Second, we can gain an understanding of the nature of the contemporary political spectrum. For example, if utopianism is equally prevalent across the political spectrum, this would run counter to the viewpoint (reviewed below) that implies those on the right are inclined to support the status quo, rather than to envisage change (see Jost, 2019).

While we can reasonably expect political orientation to be associated with the content of utopian visions, there are also strong theoretical and empirical considerations to support the notion that political orientation will be associated with utopianism, or the extent to which people will engage in thought about an ideal society at a given time. There are, however, several possibilities as to the nature of this relationship, based on different strands of research and theory on utopianism. Here, we examine three major alternative (although not necessarily mutually exclusive) hypotheses: 1) that utopianism will be more prevalent among liberals/left-wingers, 2) that utopianism will be equally prevalent across the political spectrum, and 3) that utopianism will be higher at either extreme, and lower in the middle, of the political spectrum.

Engagement in utopian thinking is also likely affected by the prevailing societal conditions in particular countries at particular times. If we consider utopian thinking to be an expression of desire for a different way of being (Levitas, 1990), then it is likely dependent upon what the status quo is at a given time and place. Indeed, previous research has found system justification (i.e., the tendency to justify the status quo) to vary by country in its relationship to political orientation (Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018, see also Jost, 2019). Similarly, Proch et al. (2019) found, among German participants, no general tendency for social change among liberals, but rather that conservatives’ or liberals’ acceptance of social change was driven by their (dis)approval of the status quo on a given issue (see also Becker, 2020). National identification has also been found to mediate the relationship between political orientation and system justification among Spanish participants (Moscato et al., 2021). Although national identification tends to be higher among conservatives, this suggests the possibility that the relationship between political orientation and system justification may change depending upon prevailing political conditions. For example, national identification may decrease among conservatives if a country has had a liberal government for some time. Thus, if defence of the status quo (and its relationship to political orientation) may change by time and place, then we can reasonably hypothesise that desire for a different way of being may be similarly affected.

With specific reference to current research, we hypothesise a difference in the relationship between utopianism and political orientation between the United States and Australia. During the time at which the data for this study were collected, the United States elected a right-wing populist President, Donald Trump. Right-wing populism has been characterised as a reaction against cultural change, including criticism of the prevailing political system and political elites, as well as a nostalgic vision of the nation’s glorious past (Jay et al., 2019; Obradović et al., 2020), and these themes were noticeable in Trump’s campaigning (e.g., ‘make America great again’, ‘drain the swamp’) (Homolar & Scholz, 2019). Given the entailed criticism of the existing political system and the positing of a nostalgic alternative vision of society, it is fair to characterise this kind of political movement as utopian. Indeed, supporters of Donald Trump were shown to be less satisfied with the general state of society than Hillary Clinton supporters (Azevedo et al., 2017). For this reason, we would expect utopianism in the United States to be associated with the third hypothesis described above: utopianism at the political extremes. That is, greater desire to imagine an alternative ideal society at either end of the political spectrum, and less among those with more centrist political attitudes.

By contrast, there has not been a comparable populist right movement in Australia during this period. The political party most often identified as right-wing populist in Australia, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (see Cover, 2020; Kenny & Bizumic, 2024), receives only a small percentage of the vote (less than 5% at the 2022 Federal election) and currently holds two of the 76 seats in the Senate (and none of the 151 seats in the House of Representatives). Australia has also had an extended period of conservative government (from 2013 to 2022) during much of the period of the present research, suggesting that those on the political right would be more inclined to support the status quo than to imagine societal transformation, and that those on the left would be more dissatisfied with the status quo and potentially dream of an alternative. For this reason, we hypothesise a relationship consistent with the first hypothesis – utopianism on the left – in Australia.

In Fernando et al.’s (2018) research, they showed evidence of a negative attitude towards utopian thinking – characterised by the perceived danger or negative consequences of dreaming of an ideal society. Notably, this did not represent the opposite pole of utopianism, with only small to moderate negative correlations between the two constructs (approximately .30), suggesting that utopianism and antiutopianism are somewhat different attitudes and may be endorsed simultaneously. In the literature on utopianism, the antiutopian position is typically identified with 1) the colloquial usage of ‘utopian’ to mean impractical or unrealistic, and 2) critiques of utopianism (see e.g., Karl Popper) on the grounds that attempts to achieve a utopian society may lead to totalitarianism (see Levitas, 1990).

One perspective on antiutopianism is that it is driven by the political status quo. When the political status quo is consistent with one’s political orientation, one may adopt a more antiutopian stance because of the risk of upsetting that desirable state. Thus, for example, when there is a more conservative government, those on the right of politics may express greater antiutopianism as the pursuit of further change may disrupt the prevailing (preferable) political conditions. Thus, in the United States, we may expect a change in antiutopianism over time, consistent with the shift from a more liberal to conservative presidency. In Australia, which had a conservative government for most of the period of study, we may expect more antiutopianism on the right.

However, based on the measures used by Fernando et al. (2018) and the typical nature of the antiutopian position we can hypothesise about an additional or alternative relationship between antiutopianism and political orientation. One possibility is to regard antiutopianism as a fear of utopian change. Given the (small) observed correlation between antiutopianism and system justification (.05 ~ .29 in Fernando et al., 2018), we may expect antiutopianism to be expressed most by those who are not only interested in maintaining the status quo, but also against social change, i.e., reactionary (Thomas & Osborne, 2022). Depending on which of the above hypotheses about political orientation and utopianism one takes, antiutopianism may be associated with the conservative side of politics (utopianism on the left), the political centre (utopianism at the extremes), or across the political spectrum (utopianism as universal).

To understand the relationship between utopianism and political orientation, we analysed several datasets collected over the past approximately eight years which contained measures of political orientation and utopianism (see Fernando et al., 2018). These were collected with participant samples from the United States and Australia, allowing for a further examination of cross-national differences in the association between political orientation and utopianism. All datasets were collected using online participant recruitment (see Table 1 for sources). Table 1 also contains a breakdown of the demographic characteristics of each sample and the distribution of each sample on the political orientation measure. A timeline of the collection of each of the seven datasets is displayed in Figure 1. All datasets were collected as part of other projects investigating various aspects of utopian thinking and utopianism, but none of the data have previously been analysed using the political orientation variable¹1

Data from November 2015 United States dataset has previously been published in Fernando et al. (2018) Functions of utopia: How utopian thinking motivates societal engagement, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 44(5), 779-792. No other datasets have yet been published.

As noted above, all participants were residents of either Australia or the United States. A total of 1,413 participants were recruited across seven datasets (see Figure 1), 582 from the United States, and 831 from Australia. Table 1 contains participant age and gender information by dataset, as well as the source for participant recruitment and descriptive statistic for the political orientation variable.

Political orientation was measured using a single, 7-point scale from -3 = very liberal to 3 = very conservative in the American samples, and -3 = very left-wing to 3 = very right-wing in the Australian samples. The difference in scale anchors reflects the way that the political spectrum is typically referred to in those countries.

Utopianism and Antiutopianism were assessed using Fernando et al.’s (2018) 8-item measure (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Four items assessed Utopianism (e.g., ‘I often think about what an ideal society might look like’) and four items assessed Antiutopianism (e.g., ‘Dreaming about an ideal society could be dangerous’). See Supplementary Materials for the complete scales.

The Time at which the data was collected was coded separately for the samples from the United States and from Australia. For the United States, the datasets were coded as -1 (prior to the nomination/election of Donald Trump), 0 (around the 2016 election) and 1 (after the Trump presidency). This coding reflects the possible influence (described above) of the right-wing populist movement in the United States. For Australia, Time was coded as a simple chronological ordering of the datasets (numbered 1 to 3).

Our findings for antiutopianism underscore the notion that utopianism and antiutopianism should not simply be considered opposite ends of a continuum. We observed only moderate negative correlations between these two constructs across our datasets, and the predictors of antiutopianism were quite different to those of utopianism. In Australia, the relationship between antiutopianism and political orientation was broadly the inverse of that for utopianism, consistent with the hypothesis that antiutopianism may be a reaction against utopian social change, rather than a preference for the status quo. In the United States, however, antiutopianism was unrelated to political orientation.

Second, we observed that antiutopianism was higher among the young, and appeared to increase over time in the United States, but to decrease for Australians. We interpret the latter finding cautiously for two reasons: 1) we did not have representative samples or measurement across even time points, and 2) the effects were relatively small. Nevertheless, we can speculate that changes in the world and society in recent times may have elicited a degree of caution about societal change. The United States experienced a turbulent period in its politics over the time of data collection, including events such as the January 6, 2021 Capitol attack, which may have made citizens aware of the possible negative consequences of enacting dramatic social change. By contrast, Australia’s change of government after nearly a decade may have made social change seem more feasible and desirable over time. We also observed a decline in antiutopianism on the far right of the spectrum in Australia at later time points (post-election). Since a more left-leaning government was elected, this is further evidence of potential shifts in utopianism/antiutopianism to reflect the political status quo. That is, antiutopianism may decrease following political defeat or social change that is inconsistent with one’s political preferences.

Regarding the effect of age, other societal events such as extreme weather events driven by climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic may have affected the extent to which young people believe they can dream of an ideal for their future. In this sense, antiutopianism may be an expression of a lack of faith in social change to achieve a better future.

Our present investigation was limited to some degree by the irregularity of data collection which meant that we may not have been able to accurately detect some effects of time on the relationship between utopianism and political orientation. We were also limited by the unrepresentativeness of our samples; for example, several of our samples contained a larger number of those on the left of politics than the right, limiting our capacity to make very strong inferences about the distribution of utopianism across the political spectrum. This also constrained our capacity to make strong inferences about some of the quadratic effects we observed. Some of our samples contained very few participants at the conservative end of the spectrum where the quadratic effect would suggest an upturn in utopianism (or downturn, in the case of antiutopianism). Replicating these effects with samples containing a more representative number of right-leaning participants would lend greater support to the notion of utopianism at the political extremes. More representative samples would also allow us to better understand how utopianism may be distributed by demographic variables such as age. In addition, data collection tied to specific events in societies (e.g., changes of government) would inform us as to some of the societal level factors which may predict changes in the utopianism-political orientation relationship.

We were also limited here by our collection of data in only very culturally similar, Anglophone nations. Even then, we observed some between-country differences, and we may expect to observe more if we were to extend our investigation across countries and cultures. For example, system justification (typically negatively associated with utopianism) has shown to be associated with liberalism rather than conservatism in France (see Jost, 2019), suggesting that utopianism may be higher on the political right. It would appear from our results (especially in Australia) that the prevailing political conditions in a country may play a role in the relationship between political orientation and utopianism.

Finally, future research may begin to examine political orientation in finer detail. Here we used a very simple (albeit widely-used) left-right self-placement measure of political orientation, however, this kind of measurement has been subject to critique on the basis that it relies heavily on the associations participants have with the terms ‘left’, ‘right’, ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ (see Bauer et al., 2017). The simplicity of a single dimension may also not capture nuances in people's political self-identification. For example, Leftists appear to be emerging as a distinct political identification that is not merely a more extreme form of liberalism and, pertinent to our current investigation, is defined in part by opposition to the status quo and desire for social change (Flores-Robles et al., 2025). A finer-grained approach could be taken by examining utopianism’s relationship with constructs previously used to characterise political orientation such as social dominance orientation, right wing authoritarianism and national identification (see Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018, for an example involving system justification).

Another future direction in examining political attitudes is to consider the construct of political interest. Those who are more politically interested may be more likely to score highly on measures of utopianism, having a more positive attitude towards thinking about a good society. Evidence suggests that political engagement is higher at the extremes and lower at the centre of the liberal-conservative spectrum (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Pew Research Center, 2021), so (assuming political interest and utopianism are correlated) this would be consistent with higher utopianism at the extremes. We note, however, that we did not only observe higher utopianism at the extremes, but also some evidence for utopianism across the political spectrum, and utopianism on the left of politics (in Australia), so it is unlikely political interest could account entirely for our results.

The results presented here suggest a complex relationship between utopianism and political orientation, including evidence of variation by country and over time. Thus, the implications of these findings should be interpreted in their national context. In the United States, we observed (1) moderate levels of utopianism across the political spectrum, and (2) somewhat higher utopianism at the political extremes than among moderates, such that an approximately equal level of utopianism was observed at either end of the political spectrum. This result is a clear rejection of the notion that utopianism and the desire for social change would be present only on the left of the political spectrum. Instead, these results suggest that (1) there may be diverse utopian visions across the political spectrum, and in this sense, the political vectors directed towards different utopian visions may be highly fragmented, and (2) those pursuing left-leaning political agendas may not only be resisted by those who favour the status quo, but also by those toward the right-wing end of the spectrum who agitate for change in a highly divergent, potentially opposite, direction. Nevertheless, although those at either end of the political spectrum are likely to have different change goals, they need not inevitably conflict. Left and right utopians may find a common cause, for instance, the eradication of corruption by the political elites.

A further possibility is that relatively high levels of utopianism on either end of the political spectrum may be associated with the extremitization of opinion, contributing to greater levels of political polarization. Although this is highly speculative and further research is needed, we provide a perspective to facilitate future research. US political elites are said to be highly divided between the Republicans and Democrats (e.g., Fiorina et al., 2008; Lelkes, 2016), while it is still debated whether the general public are as polarized as they seem (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Lelkes, 2016). However, there is evidence that the public opinions held by those identified as Republicans and Democrats have diverged over the years (e.g., Westfall et al., 2015) and there is a mutual animosity between them (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2019). It is possible that such extremitization of opinions may be associated with utopian visions on both sides of politics. In particular, the rise of right-wing utopianism may have fuelled a further extremitization of the right. Arguably, US president Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again” is an expression of utopianism, which aspires to restore the Golden Age of the United States. There are also well-known examples of utopian texts of the right such as The Turner Diaries, which has inspired the white power movement (Belew, 2018). Such right-wing utopian visions may have provided a backdrop for the January 16 Capitol attack in the United States (Dugan & Fisher, 2023). Whether, in fact, utopianism and utopian visions contribute to greater extremitization and polarization of opinion is an area for further research.

In Australia, by contrast, results largely favoured a more traditional reading of the left-right political spectrum, with consistently higher utopianism on the left of politics. However, the observation of a shift toward slightly higher utopianism on the right over time raises questions as to what may be driving such changes. One possibility is the beginning of a shift in the political culture such that Australia may come to more closely resemble the United States, with utopianism distributed more equally across politics. If this interpretation is correct, the trend toward greater utopianism on the right of politics in Australia may be a precursor to greater polarization of the Australian polity. Alternatively, the relationship between utopianism and political orientation is responsive to political events, such as the most recent Australian election. This latter explanation suggests that the kinds of challenges facing political activists may shift with major political events. In this case, an uptick in right-wing utopianism (i.e., an assertion of an alternative, right-wing ideal for society) in response to a political defeat (i.e., the election of a centre-left government). This interpretation would imply a changing environment for those advocating for more left-wing causes, such that the nature of resistance against those campaigns may shift from status quo maintenance to reactionary social change.

We began this paper with the question of whether there could be conservative utopians. Our answer, having examined data from the United States and Australia, is yes. While left-wing political projects are typically labelled ‘utopian’ (often in a pejorative sense), and utopianism was more prominent on the left in Australia, we have shown evidence of utopianism on the right. Thus, citizens on both sides of the political spectrum may be motivated to realise a version of society that differs from what they regard as the status quo.