






# When Politics Affects the Self: High Political Influence Perception Predicts Civic and Political Participation

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Supplementary Materials: Data, Materials [see Index of Supplementary Materials]



## Abstract

The present research examines the relationships between political influence perception and political participation. Classic studies have linked participation to political interest. However, they did not consider that people may become interested in politics especially when they feel it impacts their lives. In this research, we assumed that political participation would be based on the belief that politics affects one's life. This hypothesis was tested among Polish (Study 1,  $n = 1000$  and Study 3,  $n = 627$ ) and British participants (Study 2,  $n = 476$ ). We found positive links between political influence perception and various forms of participation (Study 1, Study 2). In Study 3, we experimentally manipulated thoughts about highly effective politics, which increased political influence perception and was further linked to an increased interest in politics and political participation. We discuss the role of the way people perceive politics in political participation.

## Keywords

political self, political participation, political influence perception, interest in politics, democracy

After twenty-five centuries of discussing the concept of democracy, some aspects remain contested. However, support for the idea that effective participation is key for the functioning of a democratic political system is growing (see Dahl, 2020, Chapter 4; Dalton, 2008). Therefore, understanding the intricacies of political participation is also essential, as conclusions about its role in contemporary societies may vary depending on the definition applied. Some scholars raised concerns about the lowering level of political engagement among citizens (Wattenberg, 2002), especially among the youth (e.g., O'Toole et al., 2003; for a review see, Kitanova, 2020), though it turns out that what they are often referring to is solely electoral participation. According to Hay (2007), those employing the concept of political participation limited to its formal dimension are more likely to identify a pattern of declining political participation, while those handling an inclusive definition note that new modes of participation are emerging. Moreover, given the importance of political participation for democracies, countless studies have been dedicated to determining its concomitants. Understanding why people engage in politics allows to grasp their changing needs and expectations regarding this sphere of life. In the present research, we aim to search for possible constructs that might influence one's readiness to participate politically. Specifically, we focus on the role of political influence perception (i.e., the extent to which one views politics as an essential factor influencing one's life) in political participation.

Past research concentrated on different individual-level constructs related to political participation. One of the most important is political interest – viewed as a measure of psychological engagement in politics (Blais, 2009; Brady et al.,



1995; Furman et al., 2022). Motivation to gather information about politics significantly impacts political participation because it results in the acquisition of skills and knowledge necessary for making meaningful political and societal decisions (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1990; Michalski et al., 2023). Moreover, to understand why some individuals exhibited higher levels of interest than others, past studies emphasized the role of education and family (Verba et al., 1995). Previous findings showed that agents such as family, school, and peers play a significant role in transmitting fundamental political behaviors and attitudes (Furman et al., 2022). For example, parents' actions shaped early-acquired civic norms and translated into subsequent voter turnout (Stoker & Jennings, 2006), and schools could be a space where political knowledge and interest are acquired and deepened (Neundorf & Smets, 2017; Torney-Purta, 2002). Furthermore, the level of educational attainment, though often considered a proxy for social class (Campbell, 2009), also serves as a significant predictor of different modes of political participation (Converse, 1972; Neundorf & Smets, 2017). In the next section of the paper, we argue that these variables should be linked to higher personal awareness of politics through the realization that politics has a significant impact on one's own life. According to our knowledge, none of the previous studies have explored this issue. Therefore, we aim to fill this gap and examine the link between political influence perception and political participation.

## Political Influence Perception

Not all people exhibit habitual attention to politics (Zaller, 1992). As Downs (1957) stated, most of them are rationally ignorant. This results from avoiding spending too much energy on systematically gathering and considering each portion of the information available (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Simon, 1979, 1990). Therefore, when people come across new information about politics, they often consider it superficially and do not engage in a reasoned deliberation, unless they are motivated to think this particular issue through (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In other words, some people formulate their political opinions “as they go” (Zaller, 1992) because they simply do not care for politics and, therefore, have no interest in investing their energy and resources to participate in it. This should change, however, when the encountered information is perceived as critical to self-interest (Bizer & Krosnick, 2001; Lavine et al., 2000; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Previous research found that information affecting people's lives was linked to greater perceived issue importance (Holbrook et al., 2005). For example, perceiving women's rights as directly affecting one's own life was associated with greater importance attached to attitudes about women's rights (Lavine et al., 2000, Study 1).

Therefore, perceiving politics as influencing one's life seems crucial in predicting political participation for at least two reasons. First, it is essential in attitude formation and crystallization (Lavine et al., 2000; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Petty and Cacioppo (1986) argued that without assigning personal importance to a specific information or issue, people would most likely not develop a strong attitude towards it. However, if it was perceived as exerting influence on one's life, the specific attitude's importance increased due to the deliberation process (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), which in turn enhanced the likelihood of attitude-expressive behavior in various forms of political participation (Farc & Sagarin, 2009; Holbrook et al., 2005; Krosnick & Telhami, 1995; Miller et al., 2017). Second, perceiving that a specific issue influenced one's life increased the motivation to search for relevant facts (Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and in turn strengthened one's interest in the subject (Hidi & Renninger, 2006).

Therefore, we believe that perceiving politics as having a significant impact on one's life may translate into higher interest in politics and, in turn, boost political participation. Past studies have shown that individuals retained information on a given topic better if they deemed it important (Holbrook et al., 2005), potentially because they did not rely on heuristics but engaged in a systematic processing of relevant information (Ciuk & Yost, 2016). According to our knowledge, the perception of political influence on one's life has not yet been studied as a cause of interest in politics. Previous studies focused on the importance of the attitude toward a specific issue or policy, ignoring the fact that once people realized that politics could significantly influence their lives, they might also change their attitude to politics in general, pay more attention to it and become more interested in it.

As noted earlier, politics itself can also influence political participation. Prior studies showed that certain political policies encouraged participation when they affected the issues people cared about (Hinkle et al., 1996; Krosnick & Telhami, 1995; Miller et al., 1981). The importance of a specific topic is determined by its relation to self-interest (Apsler & Sears, 1968; Petty et al., 1992). Similarly, identification with social groups may also lead to perceiving specific issues

as personally important. Studies have shown that people who linked their identities to groups affected by a certain issue were more determined to participate in action related to that issue (Hinkle et al., 1996; Krosnick & Telhami, 1995; Miller et al., 1981; Verba et al., 1995).

The mechanism translating group-related interests into self-related interests may occur in at least two ways. First, when group rights or privileges are at stake or endangered by specific policies (Modigliani & Gamson, 1979). In this case, a realization that group misfortunes and status deprivation derived from the social or the political system (not from individual failings) enhanced the intentions to act politically on combating inequalities (Miller et al., 1981). The second mechanism is related to specific values shared with the social group a person strongly identifies with. According to Sherif and Hovland (1961), when people viewed these group values as central and being consensually accepted by the group's members, they tended to attach a personal significance to them (e.g., Catholics perceive their attitudes on abortion as important, because the Catholic Church publicly took a strong stand on this matter). Indeed, studies conducted by Boninger and colleagues (1995) showed that social identification and value relevance influenced the perceived importance of a certain issue, but the impact of self-interest was the most prominent. Thus, in the present research, we argue that the general willingness to participate can be affected by perceiving politics as capable of influencing people's own lives in terms they deem important. Specifically, we believe that by showing people that politics itself has the power to notably affect their lives, we can boost civic and political participation.

## Overview

Based on previous research, we assumed that perceiving politics as exerting influence over one's own life should predict the motivation to participate in politics. However, this construct, to the best of our knowledge, has not been directly measured yet. For this reason, we developed a scale to measure political influence perception and investigated its relations with various forms of political participation in two different political contexts – Polish (Study 1 and Study 3) and British (Study 2). We chose these two specific countries because of their differences in terms of relations between personal and political values. Studies conducted by Schwartz and colleagues (2014) showed that in post-communist (e.g., Poland) and non-communist (e.g., the UK) societies citizens expressed their personal values through political attitudes differently. For instance, universalism values (i.e., understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people) correlated positively with traditional morality (i.e., a belief that the society should protect traditional religious, moral, and family values) in post-communist countries but negatively in non-communist countries. These discrepancies were interpreted as resulting from political history and experiences of system transformation in post-communist countries (Schwartz et al., 2014).

Furthermore, in Studies 2 and Study 3, we aimed to check whether the relationship between political influence perception and political participation could be accounted for by interest in politics, which was previously found to be an important predictor of political participation (Blais, 2009; Brady et al., 1995; Furman et al., 2022). We tested our assumptions using a cross-sectional (Study 1 and Study 2) and an experimental (Study 3) research design.

We measured political influence perception as a predictor in Studies 1 and 2, and as a mediator in Study 3. We used different indices of political participation as dependent variables in all studies. In Studies 1 and 2, we aimed to include at least 450 participants, which gave us a power of .80 for detecting even small associations between variables (for  $r = .13$ ; Cohen, 1988; G\*Power yields a target of 462 participants). To determine the required sample size in Study 3, we assessed the average effect sizes reported in social psychology research of  $d = .43$  (Vazire, 2016), using G\*power 3.1. (Faul et al., 2007) with the level of significance set at .05 and the level of power set at .90. As the differences were estimated between the two independent means (two-tailed), the final total power resulted in .81 (.90 x .90). The minimum sample size to detect such an effect was of at least 115 participants per condition. Data for all three studies are publicly available (see Supplementary Materials).

## Study 1

In Study 1, we used data from Poland to examine the basic relationship between political influence perception and voting in parliamentary elections. We assumed they should be positively related to each other, even when controlling for political conservatism, basic demographics, and political trust.

### Method

#### Participants and Procedure

Study 1 involved a nationwide, quota-based sample of Polish adults, representative in terms of age, gender, education, and settlement size. The sample consisted of 1000 respondents (549 women, 451 men), between the ages of 18 and 85 ( $M = 47.99$ ,  $SD = 16.49$ ). Data was collected via Pollster Institute – a Polish online research panel with prior experience in conducting academic studies (e.g., Marchlewska et al., 2022). We measured political influence perception as a predictor of voting in parliamentary elections. We also measured political trust, political conservatism, and basic demographics. Besides the variables reported here, Study 1 also involved measures of various personality and social psychology constructs (e.g., BIS/BAS, Carver & White, 1994), included for the purposes of different projects employing the same predictors (please contact the first author for details).

#### Measures

**Political Influence Perception** – For the current study, we developed a scale composed of five items assessing political influence perception (see Appendix A and B). Respondents were asked to rate their agreement using a seven-point Likert-type response scale ranging from 1 (*I strongly disagree*) to 7 (*I strongly agree*;  $\alpha = .86$ ,  $M = 4.27$ ,  $SD = 1.42$ ). Exploratory Factor Analysis with principal axis extraction provided a single factor solution explaining 56% of variance – see Supplementary materials for detailed analysis results. A higher mean score indicated higher political influence perception.

**Voting in Parliamentary Elections** – Measured with a single item: “How likely is it that you would vote in the parliamentary elections if they took place next Sunday and the COVID-19 pandemic was over?” Respondents answered on a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (*very unlikely*) to 7 (*very likely*),  $M = 5.91$ ,  $SD = 1.98$ . A higher score indicated higher voting intentions.

**Covariates** – The covariates involved political trust, measured with five items regarding the participants' trust in: the Polish Parliament, the legal system, the police, politicians, and political parties (1 = *I do not trust at all*, 7 = *I have complete trust*,  $\alpha = .84$ ,  $M = 2.61$ ,  $SD = 1.15$ ), economic (1 = *welfare state*, 7 = *free market*,  $M = 4.38$ ,  $SD = 1.63$ ) and social conservatism (1 = *liberal*, 7 = *conservative*,  $M = 3.68$ ,  $SD = 1.62$ ), gender (0 = *female*, 1 = *male*), age, education (1 = *primary degree or no degree*, 2 = *vocational degree*, 3 = *high school or post-secondary degree*, 4 = *university degree*), and settlement size (1 = *rural area or village*, 2 = *town up to 20,000 residents*, 3 = *town 20,001 – 100,000 residents*, 4 = *town 100,001 – 200,000 residents*, 5 = *city 200,001 – 500,000 residents*, 6 = *city with more than 500,000 residents*).

## Results and Discussion

#### Zero-Order Correlations

As anticipated, voting in parliamentary elections was positively correlated with political influence perception, as well as with age and education, but it was unrelated to political trust. Political influence perception was negatively correlated with political trust and social conservatism but positively with education and economic conservatism (Table 1).

**Table 1***Zero-Order Correlations Between Variables Measured in Study 1*

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Voting in parliamentary elections	–							
2. Political influence perception	.15***	–						
3. Political trust	.03	-.11***	–					
4. Gender (0 = female; 1 = male)	.07*	-.02	-.03	–				
5. Age	.11**	.05	-.01	.02	–			
6. Education	.09**	.08*	-.07*	-.02	.13***	–		
7. Settlement size	.06 <sup>†</sup>	-.002	-.09**	.11**	.33***	.05	–	
8. Economic conservatism	.06 <sup>†</sup>	-.07*	-.14***	.02	-.01	.11***	.01	–
9. Social conservatism	-.04	-.09**	.27***	.07*	-.10**	-.08*	-.09**	-.10**

<sup>†</sup> $p < .10$ . \* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

### Hypothesis Testing

We performed a stepwise hierarchical regression analysis to test whether political influence perception was an independent predictor of voting in parliamentary elections. In Step 1, we introduced the covariates (i.e., political trust, economic and social conservatism, gender, age, education, and settlement size). We found a significant positive effect of gender, age, and education, suggesting that males (vs. females), older, and more educated people scored higher on voting in parliamentary elections. In Step 2, we introduced political influence perception and found its significant positive effect on voting in parliamentary elections. The effect of gender and age, but not of education, remained significant. See Table 2 for detailed results.

**Table 2***Hierarchical Regression Results for Voting in Parliamentary Elections – Study 1*

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	$\beta$	<i>B</i> ( <i>SE</i> )	95% CI	$\beta$	<i>B</i> ( <i>SE</i> )	95% CI
Intercept		4.27 (0.42)	[3.45, 5.09]		3.46 (0.46)	[2.57, 4.36]
Gender (0 = female; 1 = male)	.07*	0.28 (0.13)	[0.03, 0.54]	.07*	0.29 (0.13)	[0.04, 0.54]
Age	.09*	0.01 (0.004)	[0.003, 0.02]	.08*	0.01 (0.004)	[0.002, 0.02]
Education	.07*	0.18 (0.08)	[0.02, 0.34]	.06 <sup>†</sup>	0.16 (0.08)	[0.000, 0.32]
Settlement size	.02	0.03 (0.04)	[-0.05, 0.10]	.03	0.03 (0.04)	[-0.04, 0.11]
Economic conservatism	.06 <sup>†</sup>	0.07 (0.04)	[-0.01, 0.15]	.05	0.06 (0.04)	[-0.02, 0.14]
Social conservatism	-.04	-0.05 (0.04)	[-0.13, 0.03]	-.03	-0.04 (0.04)	[-0.12, 0.04]
Political trust	.06	0.09 (0.06)	[-0.02, 0.21]	.07 <sup>†</sup>	0.11 (0.06)	[0.000, 0.23]
Political influence perception				.14***	0.20 (0.04)	[0.11, 0.29]
Adjusted $R^2$		.02			.04	
<i>F</i>		$F(7, 929) = 3.97^{***}$			$F(8, 928) = 5.92^{***}$	
$\Delta R^2$					.02	
$\Delta F$					$F(1, 928) = 19.04^{***}$	

<sup>†</sup> $p < .10$ . \* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Study 1 confirmed our basic prediction about the importance of political influence perception in voting in parliamentary elections. These results suggest that people who believed that politics significantly impacted their everyday lives were more inclined to cast their votes in parliamentary elections. Furthermore, this relationship was significant even after controlling for demographic variables and political trust.



## Study 2

Study 2 also explored the links between political influence perception and political participation. However, this time we considered different forms of political participation, such as voting, normative collective action, non-normative collective action, and participatory behavior, and conducted our study in a different socio-political context (i.e., among British participants). As in Study 1, we predicted that political influence perception would positively affect various types of political participation. Additionally, we wanted to check whether this relationship would be accounted for by interest in politics.

### Method

#### Participants and Procedure

Four hundred and seventy-six participants (339 women, 134 men, and three respondents who identified their gender as “other”, which for the purposes of the analyses, we coded as missing data), aged between 18 and 75 ( $M = 34.20$ ,  $SD = 12.30$ ) were recruited from the Prolific crowd-sourcing platform to complete an online questionnaire. We screened for British nationals only. Participants were asked to complete measures of political influence perception, voting, normative and non-normative collective action, participatory behavior, and interest in politics (mediator variable). We also measured political trust, political conservatism, and basic demographics as covariates. Besides the variables reported here, Study 2 also involved measures of other personality constructs (e.g., Short Dark Triad scale, Jones & Paulhus, 2014), included for different projects employing the same predictors. This dataset was also used by Rogoza et al. (2022).

#### Measures

**Political Influence Perception** – Assessed in the same way as in Study 1,  $\alpha = .83$ ,  $M = 3.42$ ,  $SD = 1.39$ . A higher mean score indicated higher political influence perception.

**Political Participation** – We included four different types of political participation.

**Voting.** Assessed by the following question: “How likely is it that you would take part in the general election if it was to occur next week and there was no pandemic?”. Respondents answered this question using a five-point Likert-type response scale ranging from 1 (*very unlikely*) to 5 (*very likely*),  $M = 3.76$ ,  $SD = 1.48$ . A higher mean score indicated higher voting intentions.

**Normative and Non-Normative Collective Action.** We used a list of eight behaviors, four for each type of collective action (i.e., normative and non-normative). Indicators of normative collective actions were: signing a petition, joining boycotts, attending legal demonstrations, and attending legal gatherings. Indicators of non-normative collective actions were: blocking the streets, destroying property, attending illegal demonstrations, and illegal gatherings. Respondents declared how often they performed these specific behaviors on a four-point Likert-type response scale (1 = *I would never do it*, 2 = *I do it occasionally*, 3 = *I do it sometimes*, 4 = *I do it on a regular basis*; normative collective action:  $\alpha = .80$ ,  $M = 2.09$ ,  $SD = 0.69$ ; non-normative collective action:  $\alpha = .84$ ,  $M = 1.18$ ,  $SD = 0.39$ ). Higher mean scores indicated higher normative and non-normative collective actions respectively.

**Participatory Behavior.** This was measured with the Participatory Behaviors Scale (Talò & Mannarini, 2015). The scale consists of twelve items measuring three types of political behavior: civic participation, formal political participation, and activism. The respondents assessed to what extent they recognized these behaviors as representative of them, using a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (*definitely unusual for me*) to 5 (*definitely typical of me*),  $\alpha = .85$ ,  $M = 2.04$ ,  $SD = 0.66$ . A higher mean score indicated higher participation behavior.

**Interest in Politics** – Measured with a single item borrowed from the European Social Survey (2018). Participants rated their interest in politics (*How interested would you say you are in politics*) using a five-point Likert-type response scale ranging from 1 (*not at all interested*) to 5 (*very interested*),  $M = 2.82$ ,  $SD = 1.26$ . A higher score indicated higher interest in politics.

**Covariates** – The covariates involved political trust assessed in the same way as in Study 1, except that trust regarded the British (not Polish) parliament ( $\alpha = .88$ ,  $M = 4.67$ ,  $SD = 1.93$ ), political conservatism (1 = *extremely liberal*, 11 = *extremely conservative*,  $M = 4.75$ ,  $SD = 2.20$ ), gender (0 = *female*, 1 = *male*), age, and education (1 = *primary degree or no degree*, 2 = *vocational degree*, 3 = *high school or post-secondary degree*, 4 = *university degree*).

## Results and Discussion

### Zero-Order Correlations

Political influence perception was positively correlated with all measured types of political participation.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, as expected, it was also related to interest in politics. Finally, regarding the covariates, political influence perception was negatively correlated with political conservatism. The relationship between political influence perception and political trust was non-significant. Table 3 presents these results in more detail.

**Table 3**

*Zero-Order Correlations Between Variables Measured in Study 2*

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Voting	–									
2. Normative collective action	.26***	–								
3. Non-normative collective action	.03	.53***	–							
4. Participatory behavior	.31***	.60***	.40***	–						
5. Political influence perception	.32***	.44***	.33***	.52***	–					
6. Interest in politics	.42***	.37***	.34***	.57***	.58***	–				
7. Political trust	.16***	-.13**	-.17***	-.01	-.02	.01	–			
8. Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	.04	-.05	.16**	.07	.09 <sup>†</sup>	.23***	-.05	–		
9. Age	-.01	-.27***	-.19***	-.11*	-.04	-.01	.21***	.04	–	
10. Education	.18***	.10*	.01	.13**	.05	.11*	.03	-.09 <sup>†</sup>	-.16**	–
11. Political conservatism	-.19***	-.49***	-.33***	-.37***	-.34***	-.31***	.32***	.02	.26***	.09*

<sup>†</sup> $p < .10$ . \* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

### Hypotheses Testing

We performed a series of hierarchical regression analyses to test our hypothesis regarding the effects of political influence perception as an independent predictor of various types of political participation (i.e., voting, normative and non-normative collective action, and participatory behavior). For ease of interpretation, the construction of the regression models was the same for each dependent variable. First, we introduced the covariates. In the second step, we added political influence perception, which turned out to be positively related to each political participation type. In the final, third step, we included interest in politics (mediator variable). After introducing interest in politics, the effects of political influence perception on normative collective action, non-normative collective action, and participatory behavior were lower, yet still significant. In the case of voting as a dependent variable, after introducing interest in politics, the effects of political influence perception on voting became not only lower, but also non-significant (see Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7).

1) Additionally, we assessed the invariance of the scale measuring political influence perception between the Polish and the UK sample. Conducted analysis revealed partial scalar invariance of the construct – see [Supplementary Materials](#) for detailed results.

**Table 4**

*Hierarchical Regression Results for Voting in General Elections – Study 2*

Variable	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			
	$\beta$	B (SE)	95% CI	$\beta$	B (SE)	95% CI	$\beta$	B (SE)	95% CI	
Intercept		2.73 (0.36)	[2.02, 3.44]		1.68 (0.39)	[0.91, 2.46]		1.38 (0.38)	[0.63, 2.13]	
Political trust	.23***	0.18 (0.04)	[0.11, 0.25]	.21***	0.16 (0.03)	[0.09, 0.23]	.19***	0.15 (0.03)	[0.08, 0.21]	
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	.05	0.15 (0.14)	[-0.13, 0.44]	.02	0.08 (0.14)	[-0.19, 0.35]	-.04	-0.13 (0.14)	[-0.40, 0.14]	
Age	.03	0.003 (0.01)	[-0.01, 0.01]	.02	0.002 (0.005)	[-0.01, 0.01]	.002	0.000 (0.005)	[-0.01, 0.01]	
Education level	.16**	0.26 (0.08)	[0.11, 0.41]	.15**	0.25 (0.07)	[0.11, 0.39]	.12**	0.20 (0.07)	[0.06, 0.34]	
Political conservatism	-.25***	-0.17 (0.03)	[-0.23, -0.11]	-.16*	-0.11 (0.03)	[-0.17, -0.04]	-.11*	-0.07 (0.03)	[-0.14, -0.01]	
Political influence perception				.25***	0.27 (0.05)	[0.18, 0.37]	.09†	0.09 (0.05)	[-0.01, 0.20]	
Interest in politics							.33***	0.39 (0.06)	[0.27, 0.51]	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		.10			.16			.22		
F		F(5, 467) = 12.03***			F(6, 466) = 15.91***			F(7, 465) = 20.53***		
$\Delta R^2$					.06			.06		
$\Delta F$					F(1, 466) = 31.38***			F(1, 465) = 40.25***		

†p < .10. \*p < .05. \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001.

**Table 5**

*Hierarchical Regression Results for Normative Collective Action – Study 2*

Variable	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			
	$\beta$	B (SE)	95% CI	$\beta$	B (SE)	95% CI	$\beta$	B (SE)	95% CI	
Intercept		2.94 (0.15)	[2.64, 3.25]		2.32 (0.16)	[2.00, 2.64]		2.25 (0.16)	[1.93, 2.57]	
Political trust	.05	0.02 (0.02)	[-0.01, 0.05]	.02	0.01 (0.01)	[-0.02, 0.03]	.01	0.003 (0.01)	[-0.03, 0.03]	
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	-.04	-0.06 (0.06)	[-0.18, 0.06]	-.07†	-0.10 (0.06)	[-0.22, 0.01]	-.10*	-0.15 (0.06)	[-0.26, -0.03]	
Age	-.16***	-0.01 (0.002)	[-0.01, -0.004]	-.17***	-0.01 (0.002)	[-0.01, -0.01]	-.18***	-0.01 (0.002)	[-0.01, -0.01]	
Education level	.03	0.02 (0.03)	[-0.04, 0.09]	.02	0.02 (0.03)	[-0.04, 0.08]	.01	0.01 (0.03)	[-0.05, 0.06]	
Political conservatism	-.45***	-0.14 (0.01)	[-0.17, -0.12]	-.33***	-0.11 (0.01)	[-0.13, -0.08]	-.31***	-0.10 (0.01)	[-0.13, -0.07]	
Political influence perception				.32***	0.16 (0.02)	[0.12, 0.20]	.25***	0.12 (0.02)	[0.08, 0.17]	
Interest in politics							.15**	0.09 (0.03)	[0.03, 0.14]	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		.25			.34			.36		
F		F(5, 467) = 33.02***			F(6, 466) = 42.30***			F(7, 465) = 38.53***		
$\Delta R^2$					.09			.02		
$\Delta F$					F(1, 466) = 65.80***			F(1, 465) = 10.66**		

†p < .10. \*p < .05. \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001.

To fully test our hypothesis, we checked for indirect effects of political influence perception on political participation variables via interest in politics, using the PROCESS macro 3.5 (Hayes, 2017; Model 4). The significance of indirect effects was tested with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (5,000 re-samples). We conducted separate analyses for each of our dependent variables. Our models included political influence perception as an independent variable, interest in politics as a mediator, and voting in general elections, normative and non-normative collective action, and participatory behavior as dependent variables. We also included covariates within each model. The results revealed a consistent pattern of relations, confirming our hypothesis that political influence perception had a significant and positive indirect effect on voting,  $IE = 0.18$ ,  $SE = 0.03$ , 95% CI [0.115, 0.242], normative collective action,  $IE = 0.04$ ,  $SE = 0.01$ , 95% CI [0.015, 0.065], non-normative collective action,  $IE = 0.03$ ,  $SE = 0.01$ , 95% CI [0.013, 0.041], and participatory behavior,  $IE = 0.09$ ,  $SE = 0.01$ , 95% CI [0.068, 0.117] via political interest. Indirect effects were also significant for each subscale of the Participatory Behavior Scale – see [Supplementary Materials](#) for detailed results.



Table 6

Hierarchical Regression Results for Non-Normative Collective Action – Study 2

Variable	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	$\beta$	B (SE)	95% CI	$\beta$	B (SE)	95% CI	$\beta$	B (SE)	95% CI
Intercept		1.59 (0.09)	[1.41, 1.77]		1.33 (0.10)	[1.13, 1.53]		1.29 (0.10)	[1.09, 1.48]
Political trust	-.06	-0.01 (0.01)	[-0.03, 0.01]	-.08 <sup>†</sup>	-0.02 (0.01)	[-0.03, 0.001]	-.09*	-0.02 (0.01)	[-0.04, -0.001]
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	.17***	0.14 (0.04)	[0.07, 0.22]	.15***	0.13 (0.04)	[0.06, 0.20]	.11**	0.10 (0.04)	[0.02, 0.17]
Age	-.13**	-0.004 (0.001)	[-0.01, -0.001]	-.14**	-0.004 (0.001)	[-0.01, -0.002]	-.15***	-0.01 (0.001)	[-0.01, -0.002]
Education level	-.02	-0.01 (0.02)	[-0.05, 0.03]	-.03	-0.01 (0.02)	[-0.05, 0.03]	-.04	-0.02 (0.02)	[-0.06, 0.02]
Political conservatism	-.28***	-0.05 (0.01)	[-0.06, -0.03]	-.19***	-0.03 (0.01)	[-0.05, -0.02]	-.16**	-0.03 (0.01)	[-0.04, -0.01]
Political influence perception				.24***	0.07 (0.01)	[0.04, 0.09]	.15**	0.04 (0.01)	[0.01, 0.07]
Interest in politics							.19***	0.06 (0.02)	[0.03, 0.09]
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		.14			.19			.21	
F		F(5, 467) = 16.92***			F(6, 466) = 19.85***			F(7, 465) = 19.35***	
$\Delta R^2$					.05			.02	
$\Delta F$					F(1, 466) = 29.36***			F(1, 465) = 13.22***	

†*p* < .10. \**p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\**p* < .001.

Table 7

Hierarchical Regression Results for Participatory Behavior – Study 2

Variable	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	$\beta$	B (SE)	95% CI	$\beta$	B (SE)	95% CI	$\beta$	B (SE)	95% CI
Intercept		2.18 (0.15)	[1.87, 2.48]		1.40 (0.16)	[1.09, 1.71]		1.24 (0.15)	[0.95, 1.54]
Political trust	.12**	0.04 (0.02)	[0.01, 0.07]	.08 <sup>†</sup>	0.03 (0.01)	[-0.001, 0.05]	.06	0.02 (0.01)	[-0.01, 0.05]
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	.08 <sup>†</sup>	0.11 (0.06)	[-0.01, 0.23]	.04	0.06 (0.06)	[-0.05, 0.17]	-.03	-0.05 (0.05)	[-0.15, 0.06]
Age	-.02	-0.001 (0.002)	[-0.01, 0.003]	-.04	-0.002 (0.002)	[-0.01, 0.002]	-.06	-0.003 (0.002)	[-0.01, 0.001]
Education level	.09*	0.07 (0.03)	[0.01, 0.13]	.08*	0.06 (0.03)	[0.01, 0.12]	.05	0.04 (0.03)	[-0.02, 0.09]
Political conservatism	-.39***	-0.12 (0.01)	[-0.14, -0.09]	-.23***	-0.07 (0.01)	[-0.10, -0.04]	-.17***	-0.05 (0.01)	[-0.08, -0.03]
Political influence perception				.43***	0.20 (0.02)	[0.16, 0.24]	.23***	0.11 (0.02)	[0.07, 0.15]
Interest in politics							.39***	0.20 (0.02)	[0.15, 0.25]
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		.15			.31			.40	
F		F(5, 467) = 17.92***			F(6, 466) = 36.41***			F(7, 465) = 46.21***	
$\Delta R^2$					.16			.09	
$\Delta F$					F(1, 466) = 108.26***			F(1, 465) = 71.80***	

†*p* < .10. \**p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\**p* < .001.

Study 2 demonstrated that political influence perception was positively linked to the whole repertoire of political participation indices (i.e., voting, normative and non-normative collective action, and participatory behaviors, such as civic participation, formal political participation, and activism), even when controlling for demographics and political trust. In this way, we managed to replicate the pattern of results obtained in Study 1 in another socio-political context (i.e., among British participants) and on a broader set of variables. The results also showed that the effect of political influence perception on political participation was, at least to some extent, accounted for by interest in politics. Therefore, it seems plausible that those who felt that politics affected their life became more interested in this domain and, in turn, seemed more willing to personally engage in political actions.

## Study 3

In Study 3, conducted among young Polish participants, we employed an experimental design to test whether inducing the notion that newly introduced policies were efficient would increase political influence perception, which would subsequently be linked to higher interest in politics and, finally, to higher political participation (serial mediation). In this way, we aimed not only to replicate the results obtained in Studies 1 and 2 but also to test an intervention that might, at least indirectly, lead to an increase in political participation by enhancing political influence perception and interest in politics. Specifically, we wanted to explore the role of policymakers in shaping citizens' political involvement. Political science has recently turned its attention toward “policy feedback” effects (i.e., the impact of specific policies on citizens' attitudes and actions; Larsen, 2019). Thus, we wanted to examine whether the effectiveness of political elites in introducing new policies was enough for citizens to perceive politics as exerting an influence over their own lives or if it was necessary for policies to be viewed as affecting the society as a whole.

## Method

### Participants and Procedure

Data for Study 3 was collected via the same online research panel as in Study 1. The sample consisted of 627 participants (324 women, 303 men,  $M_{\text{age}} = 22.32$ ,  $SD = 2.25$ , range = 18–25 years old) and was representative of young Polish adults in terms of gender, education, and settlement size. The study's design was experimental, with the perceived effectiveness of politics as the manipulated variable. Furthermore, we varied the strengths of our manipulation by presenting a list of factual policies with (highly effective politics) or without additional commentaries (moderately effective politics) on the effects of their implementation. In such a way, we aimed to check whether the mere information about changes in specific policies (i.e., moderately effective politics condition) versus a greater elaboration on the significance and general meaning of these changes (i.e., highly effective politics) would result in higher political influence perception. We also included a baseline condition, in which we did not present any information regarding factual policies. We tested whether recognizing politics as effective would increase political influence perception, which would be further linked to political participation via interest in politics (serial mediation).

Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions. In the highly effective politics experimental condition, participants ( $n = 208$ ) received a list of six political decisions with short commentaries (e.g., “Sugar tax. On January 1st, 2021, an additional fee was imposed on companies producing sugar-sweetened beverages. It directly translates into a significant rise in prices, for example, at petrol stations we now pay 7,50 zlotys for a liter of Coke.”). In the moderately effective politics experimental condition, we manipulated the perceived activity of politics in terms of introducing new policies. Participants ( $n = 210$ ) read the same list of political decisions but without the short commentaries (e.g., “Sugar tax. On January 1st, 2021, an additional fee was imposed on companies producing sugar-sweetened beverages.”). In the baseline condition, participants ( $n = 209$ ) did not receive any experimental stimuli. The exact wording of the texts is presented in the [Supplementary materials](#). Next, all participants completed the measurements of political influence perception, political interest, and political participation, as well as demographic variables.

### Measures

**Political Influence Perception** – We measured political influence perception in the same way as in Study 1 and 2,  $\alpha = .81$ ,  $M = 4.38$ ,  $SD = 1.31$ .

**Political Participation** – We included three measurements of political participation.

**Voting in Parliamentary and Presidential Elections.** These variables were measured with single questions: “How likely is it that you would vote in the parliamentary elections if they took place next Sunday and the COVID-19 pandemic was over?” ( $M = 4.28$ ,  $SD = 1.15$ ) and “How likely is it that you would vote in the presidential elections if they took place next Sunday and the COVID-19 pandemic was over?” ( $M = 4.40$ ,  $SD = 1.01$ ), to which the respondents

answered using a five-point Likert-type scale from 1 (*very unlikely*) to 5 (*very likely*),  $M = 4.28$ ,  $SD = 1.15$ . Higher scores indicated higher voting in parliamentary and presidential elections respectively.

**Unconventional Political Participation.** This construct was measured with twelve items (e.g., “Getting engaged in works for a group/an organization representing specific sociopolitical or religious views”, “Disseminating informative materials about political/social issues”). Participants were asked to indicate how likely it was that they would take part in the listed activities within the following six months, using a five-point Likert-type response scale ranging from 1 (*very unlikely*) to 5 (*very likely*;  $\alpha = .91$ ,  $M = 3.65$ ,  $SD = 1.28$ ). A higher mean score indicated higher unconventional political participation.

**Interest in Politics** – This construct was measured with two items (“Politics is interesting” and “I worry about political matters”). Respondents gave their answers using a Likert-type scale from 1 (*I strongly disagree*) to 5 (*I strongly agree*),  $r = .61$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $M = 3.04$ ,  $SD = 1.05$ . A higher mean score indicated a higher interest in politics.

**Covariates** – The covariates included economic (1 = *welfare state*, 7 = *free market*,  $M = 4.60$ ,  $SD = 1.63$ ) and social conservatism (1 = *liberal*, 7 = *conservative*,  $M = 3.43$ ,  $SD = 1.72$ ), gender (0 = *female*, 1 = *male*), age, education (1 = *primary degree or no degree*, 2 = *vocational degree*, 3 = *high school or post-secondary degree*, 4 = *university degree*), and settlement size (1 = *rural area or village*, 2 = *town up to 20,000 residents*, 3 = *town 20,001 – 100,000 residents*, 4 = *town 100,001 – 200,000 residents*, 5 = *city 200,001 – 500,000 residents*, 6 = *city with more than 500,000 residents*).

## Results and Discussion

To test whether priming highly effective and moderate politics, as compared to the baseline condition in each case, affected political influence perception, we first dummy coded our baseline condition as a reference. Two dummy coded variables were created with the following contrasts: X1 = highly effective politics versus baseline; X2 = moderate effective politics versus baseline. We then entered: covariates (i.e., age, gender, education, economic, settlement size, and social conservatism (Step 1), and two dummy coded variables (Step 2) in multiple regression with political influence perception as the dependent variable. The findings of the final model are presented in Table 8.

**Table 8**

*Regression Analysis Results for Political Influence Perception – Study 3*

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	$\beta$	$B$ (SE)	95% CI	$\beta$	$B$ (SE)	95% CI
Intercept		5.26 (0.58)	[4.13, 6.39]		5.15 (0.58)	[4.01, 6.29]
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	-.03	-0.07 (0.11)	[-0.29, 0.15]	-.03	-0.08 (0.11)	[-0.29, 0.14]
Age	-.07	-0.04 (0.03)	[-0.10, 0.02]	-.08	-0.04 (0.03)	[-0.10, 0.02]
Education level	.07	0.10 (0.08)	[-0.04, 0.25]	.07	0.10 (0.08)	[-0.05, 0.25]
Settlement size	0.01	0.01 (0.03)	[-0.06, 0.07]	0.01	0.01 (0.03)	[-0.06, 0.07]
Economic conservatism	.07 <sup>†</sup>	0.05 (0.03)	[-0.01, 0.12]	.07 <sup>†</sup>	0.06 (0.03)	[-0.01, 0.12]
Social conservatism	-.18***	-0.14 (0.03)	[-0.20, -0.08]	-.18***	-0.14 (0.03)	[-0.20, -0.08]
Highly effective politics				.09*	0.26 (0.13)	[0.01, 0.51]
Moderately effective politics				0.06	0.17 (0.13)	[-0.08, 0.42]
Adjusted $R^2$		.04		.04	.04	.04
$F$		$F(6, 620) = 4.79***$			$F(8, 618) = 4.15***$	
$\Delta R^2$					.01	
$\Delta F$					$F(2, 618) = 2.20$	


<sup>†</sup> $p < .10$ . \* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

In line with our hypothesis, highly effective politics increased political influence perception compared to the control condition. However, we found no moderate effective politics' (vs. baseline condition) effect on political influence perception.

To test the indirect effects of the experimental conditions (vs. baseline) on three types of political participation via political influence perception (focal mediator) and interest in politics (distal mediator), we performed three separate serial mediation analyses using the PROCESS macro 3.5 (Hayes, 2017; Model 6), controlling for the covariates. Results are presented in Figures 1, 2, and 3.

**Figure 1**


*Indirect Effects of Highly Effective Politics Condition on Voting in Parliamentary Elections via Political Influence Perception and Interest in Politics*



Note. Entries are standardized coefficients, dotted line indicates total effect (not controlling for the mediators). \* $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

**Figure 2**


*Indirect Effects of Highly Effective Politics Condition on Voting in Presidential Elections via Political Influence Perception and Interest in Politics*



Note. Entries are standardized coefficients, dotted line indicates total effect (not controlling for the mediators). \* $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

**Figure 3**

*Indirect Effects of Highly Effective Politics Condition on Unconventional Political Participation via Political Influence Perception and Interest in Politics*



Note. Entries are standardized coefficients, dotted line indicates total effect (not controlling for the mediators). \* $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

The analysis showed that the highly effective politics (vs. baseline) condition did not have a significant indirect effect on voting in parliamentary elections via political influence perception,  $IE = 0.01$ ,  $SE = 0.01$ , 95% CI [-0.011, 0.034]. However, the effect of the highly effective politics condition (vs. baseline) on the dependent variable was serially mediated by political influence perception and interest in politics,  $IE = 0.03$ ,  $SE = 0.02$ , 95% CI [0.001, 0.061].

A similar pattern of results emerged regarding voting in presidential elections. The indirect effect of the highly effective politics condition on voting in presidential elections via political influence perception was not significant,  $IE = 0.01$ ,  $SE = 0.01$ , 95% CI [-0.010, 0.034], but the serial indirect effect via political influence perception and interest in politics was positive and significant,  $IE = 0.02$ ,  $SE = 0.01$ , 95% CI [0.001, 0.047].

Finally, we found that the indirect effect of the highly effective politics (vs. baseline) condition on unconventional political participation via political influence perception was significant,  $IE = 0.066$ ,  $SE = 0.03$ , 95% CI [0.003, 0.131], and serially mediated by political influence perception and interest in politics,  $IE = 0.03$ ,  $SE = 0.02$ , 95% CI [0.002, 0.073].

Serial mediation analyses for the moderately effective (vs. baseline) condition revealed no indirect effects – see [Supplementary Materials](#) for detailed results.

Study 3 demonstrated that experimentally manipulated thoughts about highly effective (vs. baseline) politics increased political influence perception, which was further linked to an increased interest in politics and increased political participation (serial mediation), measured as voting in parliamentary and presidential elections and engaging in unconventional political actions. We did not observe similar effects for moderate effective politics (vs. baseline), suggesting that any interventions intended to strengthen political influence perception should emphasize the actual impact of policies on society.

## General Discussion

The literature on political participation often emphasizes political interest as one of the primary variables that shape our active engagement in politics, be it through electoral voting or unconventional participation (Blais, 2009; Brady et al., 1995; Furman et al., 2022). However, little attention has been paid to the factors that cultivate political interest, even though they may hold practical implications for boosting participation. In the present research, inspired by studies on interest development and policy feedback effects, we hypothesized that individuals would be more motivated and ready to invest time and energy in political participation if they perceived politics as a domain exerting a tangible impact on their everyday lives. To verify this line of reasoning, we designed a tool measuring political influence perception and tested its effects across three studies.

The results of Studies 1 and 2, aside from examining the psychometric properties of the proposed measurement tool, showed that it not only predicted different forms of political participation, such as voting intentions, normative and non-normative collective action, and participatory behavior, but also had an indirect effect on participation via political interest. Additionally, the scale measuring political influence perception demonstrated partial scalar invariance, which allows for comparing the means of the construct across two distinct political contexts – Polish and British.

Moreover, Study 3 demonstrated that mere exposure to information related to politics (i.e., moderate effective politics condition vs. baseline) was insufficient to translate into higher political influence perception, and subsequently, higher political interest and participation. However, providing individuals with information explicitly illustrating how political decisions shaped our reality (i.e., highly effective politics condition vs. baseline), for example, by alluding to price increases or potential benefits arising from these decisions, did predict an increase in political influence perception which, in turn, was positively linked to political interest and political participation. This aligns with previous research on interest development, which demonstrated that fostering a sustained interest in a given topic was facilitated by encountering details relevant to one's self-interest (Hidi & Renninger, 2006).

Additionally, scholars investigating the field of policy feedback effects, while having already demonstrated that specific legislations enhanced political engagement and participation, still debate why sometimes policies did not affect the general public (Larsen, 2019). We would argue that the reason is a lack of information on how these policies influenced our lives. Merely being aware of a policy's existence is not sufficient to make us realize it impacts us personally and to awake our interest in the matter. After all, educating individuals about a policy's effect cuts the cost

of political participation, as they need not spend their resources to investigate it (Davenport, 2015). However, future research would do well to determine whether this effect is independent of the importance people attribute to specific issues or not.

Our findings have important practical implications. Not only did they demonstrate that higher political influence perception predicted political participation, but they showed how to effectively make people realize that decisions made within the political sphere influence their lives. These results could be helpful for different bodies engaged in activities aimed at increasing the levels of other forms of political participation, such as political parties, social movement and non-profit organizations, workers' unions, media outlets, or even educational institutions.

## Limitations and Future Directions

The present research aimed to develop a new theoretical construct and measurement tool of political influence perception. We replicated the link between political influence perception and various forms of political participation via interest in politics across three studies, conducted in two different socio-political contexts. However, the research presented here is not without limitations.

Because Study 2 was conducted in the UK, it was not possible to provide a clear cross-cultural comparison regarding various forms of political participation other than voting intentions. This raises concerns regarding the generalization of the results as they may be context dependent (e.g., due to policies defining what modes of political participation are legal). Whether the relationships between these constructs are similar in other socio-political contexts remains a question to be addressed by future studies.

The current studies were mono-methodological – we relied solely on self-reported data. While this is justified during early stages of construct development, longitudinal studies, other reports, and implicit tests would be necessary to provide further empirical evidence of the construct's plausibility. Furthermore, each study was conducted on online research panels (i.e., computer assisted web interviews; CAWI). This carries a risk of including “professional survey-takers”, which could compromise the quality of collected data (Chandler et al., 2014; Keith et al., 2017). Being a member of a research panel increases the chance of prior exposure to research materials, potentially leading to a “non-naivete” approach to the study (DeVoe & House, 2016; Rand et al., 2014). Future research would do well to replicate the observed patterns of results using different methods that are less biased in terms of recruiting participants who are accustomed to participating in scientific research (e.g., computer assisted personal interviews; CAPI).

Another limitation of Study 1 concerned the sample size. While data from large representative samples are usually desired, they also have a shortcoming: they might be overly powered to detect even small effects. Whereas the estimates in Study 1 were in line with our expectations, they were all weak in terms of their strength. Thus, they should be interpreted and generalized with caution. This limitation was addressed in Study 2. The sample was considerably smaller than in Study 1, and the reported results were mostly congruent. Moreover, they extended not only to interest in politics but also to collective action and participatory behavior, in which political influence perception appeared to be a positive predictor of both and, as a result, provided further evidence of criterion validity. Finally, in Study 3, we demonstrated that political influence perception mediated the relation of perceived effectiveness of politics on voting intentions. Furthermore, interest in politics further mediated its association with voting intentions. While these results support our expectations, future research would do well to manipulate political influence perception per se and check whether manipulating political interest or political participation could also affect political influence perception. For example, it is possible that mere engagement in political behaviors could strengthen political perception influence. Moreover, the mediation presented in our work reveals only a part of a broader array of potential constructs that could further mediate or moderate the observed direct and indirect effects. These issues await further empirical investigations.

In conclusion, the present results revealed that political influence perception is not just an anecdotal variable, but a construct that can be successfully measured in an empirical setting. Most importantly, it could be the missing link in the causal chain building interest in politics and, in turn, shaping different forms of civic and political participation. Our results showed that providing citizens with information on how policies affect society leads to an increased level of political influence perception, political interest, and political participation respectively, and that it may have significant practical implications for policymakers and political educators as well.



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**Competing Interests:** The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

**Data Availability:** For this article, three data sets are freely available (Michalski et al., 2023a).

## Supplementary Materials

The Supplementary Materials include the following items:

- Research data and codebooks for Studies 1, 2 and 3 (see Michalski et al., 2023a)
- Experiment stimuli used in Study 3 and additional analyses mentioned in the main text (see Michalski et al., 2023b)

### Index of Supplementary Materials

Michalski, P., Marchlewska, M., Szczepańska, D., Rogoza, M., & Molenda, Z. (2023a). *Supplementary materials to "When politics affects the self: High political influence perception predicts civic and political participation"* [Research data and codebooks]. PsychOpen GOLD. <https://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.13244>

Michalski, P., Marchlewska, M., Szczepańska, D., Rogoza, M., & Molenda, Z. (2023b). *Supplementary materials to "When politics affects the self: High political influence perception predicts civic and political participation"* [Experiment stimuli and additional analyses]. PsychOpen GOLD. <https://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.13243>

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## Appendices

### Appendix A

#### *Political Influence Perception Scale (in English)*

1. Politics influences my everyday decisions.
2. Politics influences my plans for the future.
3. Politics can spoil my plans overnight.
4. What is happening in politics has an impact on my private life.
5. My sense of security depends on what is going on in politics.

### Appendix B

#### *Political Influence Perception Scale (in Polish)*

1. Polityka ma wpływ na decyzje, które podejmuję na co dzień.
2. Polityka wpływa na moje plany na przyszłość.
3. Polityka jest w stanie pokrzyżować moje plany z dnia na dzień.
4. To, co się dzieje w polityce, ma wpływ na moje życie prywatne.
5. Moje poczucie bezpieczeństwa zależy od tego, co się dzieje w polityce.