Dialogue With Difference: Meta-Representations in Political Dialogue and Their Role in Constructing the ‘Other’

Using Social Representations Theory as a Lens for Political Sense-Making

Social representation theory (SRT; Moscovici, 2001) offers a theoretical framework for understanding how knowledge is socially constructed, contested and reproduced. Crucial to the work of Moscovici was the argument against the hierarchical ordering of knowledge, where primitive/irrational and religious beliefs were gradually replaced by more superior forms of knowledge stemming from scientific discoveries and rational ways of thinking. Instead, Moscovici argued that these ways of thinking produced different forms of knowledge that serve different purposes in society. As such, SRT emphasizes the need to move away from an analytic focus on which meaning is right or wrong, and to instead focus on its symbolic function “and its power to construct what is real to a group of people” (Jovchelovitch, 2001, p. 176). As Howarth (2006) has argued, we need to push this theoretical focus on meaning-making further, to consider how thinking societies become arguing societies (Billig, 1988), where cooperation and conflict co-exist, and where social representation compete in their claims to reality and to either maintaining or transforming the social order. This focus on socially representing, as an active process (i.e., Gibson, 2012), begins to address common critiques of the theory from discursive and rhetorical psychologists. We take this challenge on board to examine “what social representations do in social and political relations” (Voelklein & Howarth, 2005, p. 448). In particular we ask, how do voters represent the political arguments of those who voted differently to them and how are these representations used to avoid, delegitimize or limit the impact of alternative knowledge?

Meaning-making, and the construction of socially shared knowledge, is not only a process that creates new content, but one that binds people together within a shared worldview and functions to defend this worldview against alternatives (Duveen, 2001). This process takes place through dialogue, giving communication a central role in both the development of, and interaction between, social representations. Elcheroth and colleagues (2011) propose the Social Representation Approach (SRA), as a framework that extends the explanatory power of SRT by incorporating broader insights from social psychological literature, including that of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The authors propose four key tenants of the approach. These are 1) social representations are shared knowledge, 2) social representations are shaped by meta-representations, 3) social representations are enacted communication and 4) social representations are world-making assumptions. This framework allows us to more closely account for the relationship between identities and representations, as well as the role of communication in developing these relationships, making it suitable for research within social and political psychology (Howarth et al., 2014; O’Dwyer, 2020).

In line with Elcheroth and colleagues (2011), we agree that how we orient towards social representations depends on how we associate these with existing social groups. Social categories become positions from which we understand and make sense of new knowledge. These social categories are in turn situated within a system of power relations that either affords people more, or less, access to defining and contesting social reality. Gillespie and Cornish (2010) show how interactions become constrained by identity positions by examining how hierarchies within a relationship (Leader v. Follower) afford some speakers greater legitimacy to assert their views, and how this can ultimately constrain cooperation. As such, engagement with new knowledge and different points of view through dialogue can be experienced as threatening and become resisted. In other words, if disagreement has the potential to threaten the binding that occurs when individuals collaboratively produce social knowledge, then it needs to be handled gently. SRA allows us to consider how this alternative knowledge is developed and positioned vis-à-vis the self through considering not only social representations, but also their interdependent counterpart – meta-representations.

Meta-Representations: What We Think Other People Think and Why It Matters

Gillespie (2008) describes meta-representations (p. 381) as over-simplified caricatures, or ‘straw-men’, imagined ideas allocated to others that become crucial for dialogue between social actors. In simple terms, meta-representations are what we think other people think, about a particular event or object. ‘Other people’ here can refer to those individuals we consider part of our groups (and so what we believe the norm is for ‘us’), those who we consider to sit outside of our groups, whose representations we interpret from the standpoint of various identities (Brasil & Cabecinhas, 2019) or to more abstracted notions of the general public (Mahendran, 2018; O’Dwyer, 2020). While shared knowledge binds individuals into communities as active members that co-construct meaning, which is essential for defining an ‘us’, meta-representations in turn allows ‘us’ to be situated in a broader world of multiple social categories (Duveen et al., 1990). There is an added dialogical layer to social representations captured in the concept of meta-meta-representations which refers to ‘what we think about other’s knowledge of us’ (Elcheroth et al., 2011). Through these concepts, a SRA illuminates how our awareness of what ‘we’ think becomes defined and shaped in relation to what we think ‘other people’ think.

Gillespie (2008) argues that ‘semantic barriers’ serve this precise function within communicative processes. Taking a more active approach in the study of social representations, semantic barriers offer a conceptual (and empirical) approach for considering how different types of social knowledge are engaged with, and resisted. As such, semantic barriers enable people to talk about a different point of view, without feeling threatened by it. For example, labelling those who are perceived to hold alternative views as ‘crazy’ allows us to dismiss their point of view as illegitimate and irrational. Gillespie (2020) categorizes semantic barriers according to three layers: avoiding, delegitimizing and limiting, each of which is drawn on if the previous level is breached. Firstly, we can avoid encounters with different points of views by making particular topics taboo. The second layer refers to delegitimization (through stigma for example) which entails acknowledging the existence of alternative views but dismissing them as irrelevant or incorrect. Lastly, if the ‘other’ perspective is not dismissed, we can limit the impact of acknowledged alternatives by either isolating them as ‘one-offs’ or rationalizing the status quo (Gillespie, 2020).

Semantic barriers can be thought of as mechanisms that allow for the boundaries between self and other to be managed and reinforced, and offer a framework through which to understand how to examine the function of meta-representations in dialogue (Nicholson, 2016; Sammut & Sartawi, 2012). It is important here to keep in mind that what we would consider opposites (i.e., moral/immoral) are not mutually exclusive, but mutually interdependent (Marková, 2003). Similarly, the representations that ‘we’ hold only make sense in relation to the ‘other’ representations ‘out there’. Therefore, by focusing our analysis on examining how people engage with, and make sense of, those who voted differently to them in the context of Brexit, we are also able to understand how they are framing and articulating their own vote, and in doing so, potentially justifying it as the ‘right’ vote.

Participants

Six focus groups were conducted with a total of 36 participants (21 females and 15 males, age range from 22 to 78, M = 39). Three of the groups included Leave voters (N = 16) and three Remain voters (N = 20). Participants were recruited from two key locations: Leave participants were from Rugby, a majority Leave area (57% voted Leave), Remain participants were from London, a majority Remain area (60% voted Remain; The Electoral Commission, 2016). Recruitment involved handing out flyers in both cities, putting up posters in public places, posting advertisements on Facebook and contacting individuals in each location to aid in recruiting potential participants. Participants were invited to take part in a study to discuss the vote and the reasons people voted differently. Table 1 provides an overview of the participant demographics. Overall, the demographics of the two groups were similar to the demographic profiles identified in previous research on Remain and Leave voters (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). Of interest to note is the age composition of Focus Group 1 (Leave voters), where three of the participants were significantly younger than the rest. Given the debate about the role of age in the Brexit vote (MacFarland & Owen, 2016), this provided an interesting context within which these differences were discussed (see Results section).

Procedure

Focus groups were conducted between April and June of 2017. Before data collection, participants completed a consent form and a short online survey collecting demographic information. Focus groups took place in ‘natural’ settings chosen by the participants including their homes and pubs/restaurants and lasted between 61 and 82 minutes (M = 70). A topic guide composed of seven open-ended questions guided the data collection. The topic guide moved from discussing their reasons for voting for/against Brexit, why people might have voted differently, their reasons behind their vote and how valid these might have been, to how they think other voters might make sense of their vote and their reasons behind it. Due to the complex phrasing of meta-representations through questions, and echoed in feedback from an initial pilot study, it was considered useful to display the questions on the table in order to aid information-processing. At the end, participants were debriefed and given the opportunity to ask questions.

Dialogical Analysis

There are different approaches towards how to conduct a dialogical analysis of qualitative data (Linell, 2009; Marková et al., 2007; Sullivan, 2011). These have emerged from different readings of work on dialogism and dialogicality (Bakhtin, 1981; Mead, 1934). The specific approach followed in the present paper draws on the work of Marková and colleagues. Their approach to dialogical analysis provides an avenue for capturing how social representations (of self and other) are collaboratively constructed and provide insight on how to examine different kinds of interactions and positionings that individuals bring to a topic, from the concrete interactions between speakers, to the broader interactions between ways of thinking (Marková et al., 2007). This approach enables an in-depth analysis of the relationship between representing, categorising and legitimising forms of knowledge.

The focus groups were transcribed verbatim, all identifying information was anonymised and pseudonyms given to participants. Analysis took place in stages to capture both the meaning of meta-representations and their use and function in intragroup dialogue on Brexit. In particular we drew on the work of Gillespie and colleagues (Aveling et al., 2015; Gillespie & Cornish, 2010) which develops a step-by-step approach focused on examining the data through selecting the representations attributed to self and other, as well as considering how the self reacts to the representations attributed to others and the impact this has on self-construction. The first stage of analysis was to capture all instances of meta-representations, i.e., when respondents discussed the reasons why other people voted differently to them. Often these were found when participants engaged in imaginary dialogue or referred to what ‘they’ (i.e., ‘others’) think, believe or feel. The meta-representations were thematically coded, to be able to acertain whether there were trends in how others’ point of view was framed. Second, we revisited this smaller sample of data to examine how the self articulated and reacted to the representations attributed to others. Here we looked in particular at how semantic barriers used. Table 2 below illustrates the semantic barriers identified in the data, including an explanation of each.

We coded for multiple elements of a dialogical analysis which are exemplified in Table 3. For example, we coded for how participants positioned themselves and others (as a voter, as a grandparent, as an experienced person), who they were addressing with their speech (focus group participants, Remainers, the general public) as well as communicative tropes, including examples, analogies, jokes or challenges, which functioned as rhetorical tools for engaging with, and potentially dismissing, alternative points of view. While the richness of a dialogical analysis can be seen in Table 3, for purposes of clarity not all elements are included in the presentation of the analysis, instead we focus on unpacking prevalent meta-representations and how these were communicated about in the group.

Leave Voters Focus Groups

When Leave voters were asked to make sense of why others voted Remain, they constructed meta-representations that delegitimized the Remain vote. The most prevalent themes of meta-representations across the focus groups were: ‘Remainers lack knowledge and experience, ‘Remainers want to be looked after by the EU’ and ‘Remainers are scared of change’. Consider the following Extract where James and Liam try to make sense of the reason why Remainers voted the way they did.

The Extract exemplifies the meta-representation ‘Remainers are scared of change’. By drawing on this meta-representation participants are actively engaging in the construction of the meaning of ‘who’ voted Remain, and what this decision says about ‘them’. Rather than engage with the arguments for remaining, they focus on identifying the position that this perspective comes from. The continued use of the word ‘might’ (‘people might believe’, ‘there might be’) attempts to articulate meta-representations of the vote that are different to theirs, while simultaneously drawing on the semantic barrier of ‘bracketing’ to put this perspective into question, and the extent to which it is ‘real’. In Table 2 we further see another example of bracketing which also highlights how meta-meta-representations were present in the dialogues. Here, Leave voters mockingly took on the perspective of Remains on themselves (‘Yeah, apparently we didn’t understand it. We’re all racist and brain dead.”). While meta-meta-representations were less common in the discussions, they did occur and they served to undermine the other. Communicative tropes such as sarcasm and jokes were common for blocking dialogue by making the alternative seem absurd, and therefore not in need of addressing (see examples for ‘Stigma’ and ‘Undermining motive’ in Table 2).

Additional semantic barriers include (subtle) stigma which presents those who believe in the ‘fearmongering’ as weak (‘a lot of fear around change’) and uncritical (‘could not see through the BS’). This implicitly creates a juxtaposition between ‘them’, who voted emotionally, and ‘us’, who voted rationally, echoed in previous research on political talk around Brexit (Andreouli et al., 2019). This was present in other groups as well, where participants further tried to define ‘who’ holds these meta-representations and why.

This Extract shows the three most prevelant meta-representations at play: Remain voters as scared of change (Amanda), Remain voters as wanting to be looked after by the EU (Karen) and Remainers lack of knowledge and experience of the past (Bradley). Meta-representations become apparent in dialogue, both indirectly (‘People didn't want change’) and directly, via virtual voice and addressing distant others (family members not present; “they say ‘no granddad, we’ll be better off’”). Participants draw on multiple semantic barriers to deligitimize these meta-representations. Firstly, the ‘people’ who voted Remain are quickly turned into ‘that age group’, as participants try to narrow down and define who these ‘people’ are by anchoring them in particular demographics, different to their own. This is followed by the use of the semantic barrier ‘transference of meaning’, where the group ‘Remainer’ is now understood through the meaning participants already have of ‘youngsters’. The continued use of the words ‘all’ (‘all they knew’, ‘all they’d known’, ‘all lack of experience’) formulates an extreme-case argument where the semantic barrier ‘attribution of ignorance’ (Sammut & Sartawi, 2012) is used and applied to all Remainers (as young people).

By suggesting that Remain voters are missing vital information and life experience, Leave voters imply they are ignorant. In doing this, Leave voters assert their knowledgeableness, reaffirming that they are in a position to make the correct political decision. Through this process, the meta-representation becomes rooted in biological (‘they naturally think’) rather than ideological or political differences. Consequently, because differences in opinion become rooted in ‘natural’ differences of age, the need to engage in political talk becomes somewhat superfluous, because there is nothing that can be changed. As Gillespie (2008) argues, meta-representations are often oversimplified representations constructed in ways that they become an inverse of what the speaker wants to say, either about the shared object or about themselves. We see this in the above Extract, where participants first articulate the meta-representation and then use semantic barriers to frame it as coming from the position of young and ignorant, which in turn allows them to position themselves as older and more knowledgeable. Interestingly, one of our focus groups included Leave voters of different generations, which brought this opposition to the surface and created a context where this attempt at anchoring perspectives in distinct social categories had implications for how ‘informed’ certain focus group participants were, despite having all made the same decision in the vote.

This is another example of two prevelant meta-representations including Remain voters lacking historical and personal experiences (‘old farts like us remember what it was like before’) and being scared of change (‘I don’t know what the future is, why change it’). Ryan and Jasper are in their early 20’s, falling into ‘that age group’ (Extract 2) that voted Remain, but actually being Leave voters themselves. In contrast, Ronald and Terry are both older voters. The presence of Ryan and Jasper creates an interesting situation within which age comes to the surface, and the young-old opposition creates slight tensions for the younger participants. Across the interaction, participants draw on virtual voices but they attribute these to different positions. Ronald positions himself and Terry as knowledgeable (‘who remember what it was like before’) using history and experience as sources of legitimacy. Ronald’s use of a virtual voice is attributed to the social category of younger people in general, who in the realm of politics are ‘just going along for the ride’. Through the semantic barrier ‘undermining the motive’, Ronald dismisses young peoples’ (and Remainers’) representations of the vote as irrelevant, by making it seem as if young people did not actively think about the vote, nor have the lived experience to understand it. While this is later challenged by Ryan and Jasper, who defend their own position as rooted in ‘reason’ (‘I’ve got the reasons I voted out’), and attempt to engage with the perspective of (young) Remain voters (‘I think what they’re thinking…’), they ultimately reproduce the ‘youth is equal to ignorant’ stigma voiced at the start of the Extract (‘As you say, the younger people, us three, we don’t fully understand it.’).

Similarly to Extract 2, age becomes a position of greater authority, but in this Extract we see how it plays out in shaping what can be said, and by whom (Duveen, 2001; Gillespie & Cornish, 2010). Ronald speaks in a more challenging and direct manner in comparison to Ryan who is more reserved and Jasper who even concedes to Ronald’s point about younger generations (and by implication Remainers) being ignorant (‘us three, we don’t fully understand it’). Ronald uses jokes consistently (‘old fart like us’), which diffuses tension between group members and promotes intragroup dialogue, but inadvertedly blocks dialogue with the alternative point of view.

Remain Voter Focus Groups

In making sense of the Leave vote, Remain voters drew on three key meta-representations: ‘Leavers voted out of frustration’, ‘Leavers did not know about all the facts’ and ‘Leavers were manipulated by the media’. Mirroring the Leave voters, Remain voters also grounded the meta-representations of Leavers alongside interdependent pairs ignorant and knowledgeable, as well as weak and strong. However, a significant difference here was that Remain voters constructed the Leave vote as driven by misinformation and deception by media rather than a lack of experience, and as driven by anger (more than fear).

In the above exchange, meta-representations are elicited through the use of a virtual voice (‘I wanted to vent my frustration’) referenced from a previous conversation (‘I spoke to some people’). The meta-representations attributed to Leave voters emphasize emotionality:‘Leavers voted out of frustration. This meta-representation is delegitimized primarily through ‘undermining the motive’ behind the Leave vote. By positioning Leave voters as emotionally driven (‘letting off steam’, ‘pissed off’), the outgroup is constructed as politically immature (‘didn’t take it very seriously’) and reckless (‘I should have thought about this a lot more’), by implication making this alternative perspective invalid. This ironically positions Leave voters as regretful of their own vote (‘It’s not really what I wanted’).

The conclusion of constructing the ‘other vote’ this way is that it implicitly positions the ingroup as more rational and ultimately ‘right’. In another group, this sense of being right was coupled with a sense of responsibility, and subsequent failure, to educate other voters into engaging critically with politics.

In discussing the Leave vote and their reasons for it, Alexis articulates the meta-representation ‘Leavers were manipulated by the media’ while Helen reiterates the emotionality of their vote by drawing on the meta-representation of ‘Leavers voted out of frustration’. Helen recounts an exchange between herself, her partner and his housemate prior to the vote. Through the use of reported speech, Helen depicts the Leave vote as driven by convenience (‘my parents are voting Leave’) rather than deliberate thought. This image allows the perspective of this Leave voter to be discredited through undermining the Leave voters motives by positioning them as ‘easily swayed either way’. As with the meta-representations of Leavers, Remainers utilized the opposition of strength-weakness, but here to depict Leavers as victims of political propaganda (‘It almost did people who voted Leave a real injustice’). Consequently, they deny Leavers any legitimacy in their opinions and voting choice because it was not based on the right information.

In turn, a sense of accountability and responsibility on the part of the ingroup to ‘educate’ and inform outgroup members is voiced, perpetuating a position of the ingroup as better suited to make informed decisions. As Marková et al. (2007, p. 66) argue, “focus group discussions are based partly upon explicit elements and partly upon implicit assumptions that form a taken-for-granted background for communication”. In the case of Remain discussions, an educational divide formed the background for how the perspective of ‘others’ was anchored in a social position. Leave perspectives were commonly dismissed as ignorant and Leave voters perceived as uneducated, but where this was challenged with counterexamples, communicative tropes aimed at opening dialogue with alternative representations, we see how participants work to construct these as exceptions to the rule.

First, we see the meta-representations of Leave voters as voting out of frustration (‘very unhappy with their situation’) and as not knowing all the facts (‘misinformation’). The semantic barrier attribution of ignorance is used to present the perspective of Leavers as illegitimate because it was based on erroneous knowledge. These meta-representations are countered by the introduction of an ‘exception’: informed and educated people (‘but’) who voted Leave. Here we see what Marková et al. (2007) refer to as the implicit assumptions enabling communication, where more educated people are assumed to have ‘known better’. As a consequence, participants struggle to make sense of how an educated colleague can hold a different perspective (‘I’m not really sure why’) and use the semantic barrier ‘bracketing’ to question the reality of how informed this person really was (‘he came across well informed’) which itself is subsequently challenged by a more definitive statement (‘he was very informed’).

The seeming contradiction between the social category of a highly educated voter, whose life would be negatively affected by the vote (‘both of those areas would be heavily affected’) and the desire to vote Leave, is managed by an appeal to emotionality (‘felt strongly’). Nevertheless, this creates an uncomfortable reality within the group context, where the opposites of ignorant-knowledgable is broken down, and leads to a shift in conversation, where Hattie moves the conversation to focus on the role of age in defining the ‘who’ and ‘why’ of the Leave vote.